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  In everyday life, we are frequently exposed to different smart technologies. From our 
smartphones to avatars in computer games, and soon perhaps humanoid robots, we are surrounded 
by artificial agents created to interact with us. Already during the design phase of an artificial agent, 
engineers often endow it with functions aimed to promote the interaction and engagement with it, 
ranging from its “communicative” abilities to the movements it produces. Still, whether an artificial 
agent that can behave like a human could boost the spontaneity and naturalness of interaction is still 
an open question. Even during the interaction with conspecifics, humans rely partially on motion cues 
when they need to infer the mental states underpinning behavior. Similar processes may be activated 
during the interaction with embodied artificial agents, such as humanoid robots. At the same time, a 
humanoid robot that can faithfully reproduce human-like behavior may undermine the interaction, 
causing a shift in attribution: from being endearing to being uncanny. Furthermore, it is still not clear 
whether individual biases and prior knowledge related to artificial agents can override perceptual 
evidence of human-like traits.  
A relatively new area of research emerged in the context of investigating individuals’ 
reactions towards robots, widely referred to as Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). HRI is a 
multidisciplinary community that comprises psychologists, neuroscientists, philosophers as well as 
roboticists, and engineers. However, HRI research has been often based on explicit measures (i.e. 
self-report questionnaires, a-posteriori interviews), while more implicit social cognitive processes 
that are elicited during the interaction with artificial agents took second place behind more qualitative 
and anecdotal results. The present work aims to demonstrate the usefulness of combining the 
systematic approach of cognitive neuroscience with HRI paradigms to further investigate social 
cognition processes evoked by artificial agents.  
Thus, this thesis aimed at exploring human sensitivity to anthropomorphic characteristics of 
a humanoid robot's (i.e. iCub robot) behavior, based on motion cues, under different conditions of 
prior knowledge. To meet this aim, we manipulated the human-likeness of the behaviors displayed 
by the robot and the explicitness of instructions provided to the participants, in both screen-based and 
real-time interaction scenarios. Furthermore, we explored some of the individual differences that 
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SECTION I - INTRODUCTION1 
  
                                                 







1.1 Mental activity and mindreading 
 
Mental activity is a fascinating mystery that humans have tried to unveil since the very beginning of 
philosophy. According to the Cambridge dictionary the verb “to think” refers to activities such as “to 
consider”, “to meditate”, “to remember”, “to wish”, “to desire” or “to intend”. There is one common 
feature that links all these verbs: reference to the content, the direction toward an object (Brentano, 
1874), or the feature of “aboutness” (Burgos, 2007; Millikan, 1984) – something that has been 
highlighted by philosophers, as the key feature of mental states (Brentano, 1874), reflected in 
language structures of “propositional attitudes” (Russell, 1905) inherently containing “aboutness” (I 
believe that… I worry that…I hope that…). According to Searle (1980), what differentiates a natural 
human thought from a computer program can be illustrated by the famous “Chinese room” thought 
experiment:  although a computer might be able to perfectly operate on the syntax and symbols of a 
language, it will not understand the meaning, the “aboutness” related to all mental processes of 
humans. 
  In terms of etymology, in languages originated from Latin, the verb “to think” is derived from 
“pensum”, which used to be the quantity of wool assigned to the weavers in Roman times. It described 
a simple material, which could be transformed into something complex through work and dedication. 
Whereas for Latins the activity of thinking was connected with practical and manual activities, 
ancient Greeks had already developed and entrenched the concept of “νοῦς” (noûs), which referred 
to the intellectual perception of reality from the “thinker” perspective. Since Anaxagoras, 
philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and researchers tried to explain what it means “to think” 
and what are the underpinning mechanisms involved in such an activity. Reviewing theories of 
thinking is beyond the aims of this chapter, but it is interesting to point out that after more than two 
thousand years, the debate on the materialistic or abstract nature of thinking is still heated. According 
to neuroscientific accounts, the activity of thinking is considered to be the result of the elaboration of 
information collected by our sensory system. Therefore, from a biological point of view, the mind 
itself can be treated as a result of brain activity, which can be explained in terms of electrochemical 
signals. On the other hand, certain philosophical perspectives postulate that this explanation seems to 
be too reductive. Various degrees of mind-body dualism or non-reductionism have been proposed 
since Descartes.  Fodor, for example, pointed out that it is impossible to infer high-level properties 
exhibited by a system just from knowing lower-level properties (Fodor, 1975). Similarly, Putnam 
claims that micro-properties of molecules or atoms are not sufficient to explain macro-properties of 






reducible to brain activity continues to be extremely prominent in the philosophy of mind, but it is 
outside the scope of this chapter. 
 Despite the lack of agreement about the nature of thinking, attribution of thoughts to others 
has undeniably practical consequences in everyday life. When we are interacting with others, we 
probably do not ponder over the etymology or the meaning of the concept of “thinking”, but we still 
formulate hypotheses, predictions, expectations, and, more broadly, representations of the others’ 
goals, desires, and intentions, and behaviors following from those. We “think” spontaneously about 
others’ and our own mental states. In order to survive in the complexity of the world we are living, 
our species phylogenetically developed flexible strategies of understanding others’ thoughts, 
strategies that adapt to the situation that is being experienced at a given moment and/or to the 
interaction partner.  In the last fifty years, growing interest in social cognition led researchers to 
investigate new questions related to the attribution of thoughts to others. Social cognition refers to 
the cognitive processes that underlie social interactions, including perceiving, interpreting, and 
generating responses to intentions, disposition, and behaviors of others (Green, Horan, 2010). The 
ability to infer and predict intentions, thoughts, desires, intuitions, behavioral reactions, plans, and 
beliefs of other people is a crucial facet of social cognition (Frith, Frith, 2012) and is often referred 
to as “mindreading” or “mentalization”. Mindreading is a concept developed to describe the process 
of understanding or predicting other people’s behaviors in terms of their thoughts, feelings, wishes, 
beliefs, or desires.  It represents all the processes that allow us to understand behavior in terms of 
underpinning internal states and making behavior meaningful (Fonagy, 2018). This ability enables 
individuals to assess or understand other’s mental states in a specific situation and, thus, to interpret 
and anticipate their behaviors (Bèrubè, 2013).  
Mindreading is activated through the attribution of mental states to others, which may differ from 
one’s own (Korkmaz, 2011; Sabbagh, 2004). Some authors postulated that such ability is driven by 
innate neural mechanisms dedicated to mental state reasoning (Fodor, 1983; Sholl, Leslie, 1999; 
Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995). Other authors claimed that that reasoning about others’ mental states 
requires the capability to empathize with someone else, and that this depends on personal experience 
(Lillard, Kavanaugh, 2014; Taylor, Carlson, 1997). The study of these mechanisms constantly 
requires a revision of models at multiple levels, which are valuable as far as each captures different 
phenomena, and no single level can be eliminated (Schaafsma et al., 2015). Despite the differences 
in such models, the ability to read another agent’s mind seems to be recruited every time we predict 
the behavior of other agents. This requires tracking and representing: (1) the agent that displays the 






relation between the two (based on cues relevant to the mental state of the agent) (Baron-Cohen, 
2013). Then, we use those representations to predict and/or interpret the action(s) of the agent. It is 
now widely recognized that mindreading presents universal features and its pattern of development 
in humans is remarkably similar across different cultures. For example, it has been shown that 
understanding false belief emerges in children of the Baka, a preliterate tribe in Cameroon (Avis and 
Harris, 1991), at a similar age to children living in the Western world. A meta-analysis of children’s 
false belief studies provides parallel developmental trajectories of mindreading abilities in Chinese 
and North American children, coupled with differences of approximately two years in acquisition 
timing across communities (Liu et al., 2008). These data support the idea that mindreading abilities 
constitute a human “universal”. However, specific, experiential factors (i.e. peculiar educational 
practices, social habits) may impact temporal aspects of this ability (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006).  
According to some anthropologists, primitive forms of mindreading abilities can be retraced in other 
mammals. Jolly and Humphery, in 1966 and 1976,theorized one of the best-known evolutionary 
hypotheses for mindreading (i.e. “Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis”) according to which: "the 
social environment might have been a significant selective pressure for primate intelligence" (see 
Byrne & Whiten, 1997). Primates show a “surplus” of intelligence that overcomes the immediate 
survival needs, like eating, avoiding predators, feeding offspring, etc. According to the Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis, this surplus intelligence should be advantageous for social manipulation, 
deception, and cooperation (Speber, 2002). This suggests a slightly independent evolutionary history 
of mindreading abilities from that of language.  
Notably, more recent computational models of mindreading and language suggest a strong co-
evolution of such abilities. If, from one side, language relies on mindreading for recognizing 
communicative intentions, mindreading abilities profit from language in turn, for expressing mental 
states explicitly, and for transmitting the knowledge of such mental states to others. Given this 
interdependence, it has been hypothesized that language and mindreading have co-evolved, due to 
the social pressure characterizing most mammals’ environment (Kapron-king, Kirby, & Woensdregt, 
M, 2020). Indeed, primates are essentially social animals, and group living certainly confers adaptive 
advantages on the individual such as better protection from predation and food sharing (Alexander, 
1987). On the other hand, group living incurs the cost of directly competing for resources and sexual 
partners. This situation may have created specific selective pressures in primates to evolve ‘social 
intelligence’ (Whiten, 2000). Crucial in the context of primate group living with strong mutual 
dependency and complex interactions is the ability of individuals to identify others who cooperate 






cooperation will be reciprocated, cheating could be an even more successful strategy for another 
subject. Thus, to counteract cheating one must be able to detect deception (Trivers, 1971). Premack 
and Woodruff (1978), studying chimpanzee social abilities, inferred that an agent display 
mindreading abilities every time it imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences 
of this kind is properly viewed as a theory (aka “Theory of Mind”, ToM), because such states are not 
directly observable, but used to make predictions about the behavior of others.  
Nowadays, this evolutionary mindreading model appears to be limited (Martin, 2016), 
especially because it does not give any clues about the nature of the construct. In 1978, Dennett 
suggested the use of “false-belief” tasks to study the mechanisms underlying mindreading. 
Developmental psychologists rapidly adopted mindreading models to explain the acquisition of a 
‘mental perspective’ in children (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Some authors hypothesized that the 
capacity to understand that others can hold beliefs that might differ from one’s own is acquired at age 
5–6 years (Perner and Wimmer, 1985). This acquisition includes the capacity to distinguish between 
mental and physical objects, interpret the gaze of others, and understand their mental states, desires, 
and intentions. More recent studies showed that precursors of these abilities may be acquired around 
2-3 years (e.g. Perner, 2001). According to Goldman (1992), pretense and pretend could be 
considered as key factors for the development of such skills, and provide useful insights to the 
neuropsychological approach to mindreading. Indeed, pretense and pretend plays enable the infant to 
decouple and construct secondary representations, and has been renamed as ‘meta-representation’ 
(Leslie, 1987). From a neuropsychological perspective, the brain may possess a “mind-reading” 
system, composed of an “Intentionality Detector” (ID), an “Eye Direction Detector” (EDD), and a 
“Shared Attention Mechanism” (Baron-Cohen, 1995). The ID is proposed to be a perceptual device 
that interprets ‘primitive volitional’ mental states such as goals and desires (i.e. “the agent wants”). 
These are seen as basic mental states required for making basic sense of the movements of all 
organisms in the environment (Goldman, 2006). The second innate mechanism (EDD) has three basic 
functions of detecting the presence of eye-like stimuli, computing whether eyes are directed towards 
it or towards another direction, and inferring from the observation that the organism’s eyes are 
directed at something else that it actually sees something (Macrae, 2002). Finally, the SAM is 
considered to be a higher-order skill that allows the individual to form what is called ‘triadic 
representation’ (Langavant, 2011). Triadic representations conceptualize relations between an Agent, 
the Self, and an Object (which can be another agent). The SAM builds triadic representations by 
perceiving the perceptual state of another agent and computes shared attention by comparing another 






go well beyond the tepid functional proposal made by Premack and Woodruff (1978). Problems that 
before 1978 would have been deemed as falling under categories such as metacognition, attribution 
theory or “Piagetian” developmental studies are now being called “mindreading research” (Flavell 
and Miller, 1998: 853); even putative deficits in mindreading have become an explanatory concept 
for autism, schizophrenia, and related disorders (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985; Frith and Frith, 
2003).  
 
1.2 Ascribing a “mind” to artificial agents 
 
1.2.1 The intentional stance and mindreading  
 
The advent of new technologies - seemingly smart artificial agents, such as Apple’s Siri, 
Amazon’s Alexa or Google Home assistant is giving researchers new tools to test mindreading 
models, pushing the cognitive flexibility of the human social brain from the natural domain to towards 
the artificial.  Such technologies seem to display a certain degree of “artificial thinking” that 
resembles (but only to a very limited extent) human thought. But do artificial agents lead people to 
treat them like “thoughtful” agents? Artificial intelligence that these agents seem to display might 
enhance humans’ tendency to anthropomorphize agents for which they lack specific knowledge and, 
as a cascade effect, this might lead towards maindreading. Whether it is possible, or desirable, to 
attribute mental states toward artificial agents is still an open question. However, addressing this point 
is important not only for theoretical purposes but also for practical and ethical consideration about 
the design and development of social artificial agents.Already in the seventies, Dennett proposed an 
account addressing how humans understand and predict the behavior of various systems (Dennett, 
1971). The author postulated the existence of different strategies, called stances. According to 
Dennett, when we are interacting with inert objects, such as a leaf falling from a tree, we explain the 
behavior we might see in terms of physical laws. A leaf falling to the ground is just an effect of the 
gravity pull. Thus, we adopt the physical stance to understand the behavior of a physical system and 
predict its consequences. The very same model can be applied to a ball rolling down the street, whose 
behavior is explained in terms of acceleration, gravity pull, attrition, etc. However, when the object 
we are perceiving is a complex artifact, such as an airplane landing at the airfield or a car moving 
through a street, relying on physical information might not be an efficient (or accessible) strategy to 
explain and predict the behavior we are observing. To predict efficiently the behavior displayed by 






calls the design stance. The fact that a car is moving is not explicable just in terms of inertial motion, 
but it becomes clearer as we start thinking about the design of the motor or the brake. When we are 
interacting with very complex agents, such as humans, neither the physical nor the design stance can 
provide an efficient model of explanation. For example, if a person talking to us and repetitively 
moves her head in the direction of a clock, neither the physical proprieties of the agent nor the 
anatomy underpinning the neck movement might be a reliable source of information to make efficient 
predictions regarding the person’s behavior.  In the depicted scenario, the behavior displayed by the 
agent might be due to her boredom or her intention to leave us as soon as possible. Therefore, to 
understand and predict her behavior, we need to include in our model a representation of the agent's 
internal states, adopting what Dennett calls intentional stance. Adopting the intentional stance means 
to treat the acting agent as an intentional being, who is aware of their behavior and who acts to 
maximize the likelihood of achieving a pre-set goal. In other words, adopting this attitude allows us 
to treat the behavior as a consequence of a mental act, which is directed toward an object. Here, the 
terms “intentionality” is related to Brentano’s conceptualization, since adopting an intentional stance 
implies the understanding of an immanent interconnection between mental phenomena and objective 
contents towards which the phenomena are directed (the “aboutness”) (see Mayer-Hillebrand, 1951; 
Jacquette, 1991).  It is important to point out that the adoption of such strategies does not necessarily 
imply the ascription of a mind to the perceived agent. For example, when we are interacting with 
agents that display artificial intelligence, the most efficient way to interact with them might be the 
adoption of the intentional stance. When we need to ask our smart assistant about the weather 
condition or the latest news, the easiest way to communicate our request is to treat it as if it was an 
intentional being. This does not imply that we represent it as a “true believer” (Dennett, 1981), 
equipped with mental states. The intentional stance seem to be adopted by default when interacting 
with other humans, but it might allow individuals to deal with unknown entities as well, or with 
artifacts whose behavior is ambiguous or impregnable. This tendency to attribute intentionality 
towards unknown entities might depend on the natural tendency humans have to attribute 
anthropomorphic traits towards entities for which they lack a specific knowledge. Indeed, the 
adoption of these three stances depends on the knowledge, the experience, and the representation that 
humans build around the acting agent. This means that when such knowledge and representation 
changes, also the strategy we are adopting toward the agent might change. This flexibility is essential 
since our cognitive system needs to constantly deal with an overwhelming amount of information 
coming from the environment, relying on a limited pool of resources. Therefore, when a certain 






rapid adaptation of the entire system. On the other hand, when a simpler and less cognitively 
demanding model is efficient to explain and predict an agent’s behavior, resources shall be shifted 
toward this latter model.  
Therefore, we can define the “intentional stance” as the disposition to treat an entity as a 
rational agent, possessing mental states, which can be used to interpret and predict the behavior it 
displays (Frith & Frith, 2006). In this sense, the intentional stance can be considered a crucial 
component of mindreading. Indeed, mindreading is an extremely complex cognitive function that 
refers to the entire process of ascribing and reasoning about an agent’s mental states. Dennett himself, 
in 1987,  described the intentional stance as follows: “Here is how it works: first you decide to treat 
the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that 
agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it 
ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to 
further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs 
and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you 
predict the agent will do”. In other words, the behavior of an agent is the principal source of 
information for making attributions about their mental states, but such information is only used in 
this way when we adopt an intentional stance. This implies that the intentional stance could be 
adopted towards any artifact as long as it fulfils the stance’s assumption that it is a “rational” agent. 
Therefore, the main requirement of a system for being treated as intentional is displaying a behavior 
that could be well explained by adopting the intentional stance. This does not necessarily require 
perceiving the system itself to have mental states (Marchesi et al., 2019). Thus, we might even 
consider the intentional stance as one of the key “prerequisites” for mindreading (Abu-Akel et al., 
2020). Specifically, while the intentional stance corresponds to the general attitude that an individual 
takes towards explaining others’ behaviors, mindreading refers to explaining a particular behavior in 
a particular context, with reference to the underpinning mental states. 
 
1.2.2 Empirical approaches to studying intentional stance towards artificial agents 
 
As mentioned above, new technologies provided researchers with new tools to explore in more 
complex interactive scenarios the question of attribution of intentionality to artificial agents. In 
particular, robots are of interest, as they are embodied, thus introducing physical (and potentially 
social) presence in the environment, they can manipulate the environment, thus introducing artificial 






an exactly specified and controlled way. In this context, it is therefore promising to examine whether 
and when humans adopt an intentional stance to robots. 
 Some authors claim that implicit social signals lead humans to perceive automatically an agent 
behavior as the reflection of mental operations (for a review see Frith, Frith, 2008). We speculate that 
designing artificial agents that can closely imitate humans’ behavior, even at the level of implicit 
social signals, would induce humans to perceive them as intentional agents.  Some recent studies 
suggest that the perception of the intentionality of action might be an automatic and immediate 
process. In 2007, Terada et al. investigated whether such an automatic process happens when 
participants are exposed to reactive movements of non-humanoid artificial agents (a chair or a cube 
with wheels). In their experimental setup, participants were observed while they were freely 
interacting with an artificial agent in an empty room. The movement of the artificial agent was 
remotely controlled and could be periodic or reactive. While in the first case, the movement of the 
artificial agent was random, in the reactive condition the movement was happening immediately after 
the movement of a participant. At the end of the interaction, participants were asked to fill 
questionnaires in order to evaluate whether the movement of the agent was perceived as intentional 
or not. Results showed that the physical appearance of the agent (chair vs cube) did not affect the 
attribution of intentionality, while the movement profile (periodic vs reactive) played a significant 
role in such attributions. In their experiment, authors demonstrated that when the behavior of an 
artificial agent is contingent on human behavior, participants tend to evaluate it as goal-directed. In 
their study, the authors claim that enhancing the sense of intentionality perceived toward a robot is 
the key to smoothing communication between these agents and humans. The same authors 
demonstrated in a follow-up experiment (Terada et al., 2008) that other factors might affect 
intentionality attribution toward artificial agents. For example, context and participant’s expectations 
might have an impact on the attribution of intentionality. In line with this, Wiese, Wykowska et al. 
(2012) showed that what mattered in evoking engagement in joint attention with a robot avatar was 
the belief that participants held regarding its agency, rather than the actual physical characteristics of 
the agent. The authors manipulated the instruction that they have given to the participants of their 
study. In one condition, participants were instructed that the robot face they were observing was 
controlled by a human, while in another condition, they received an instruction that it was just a pre-
programmed automaton. Joint attention (measured in the form of gaze cueing effects, Friesen & 
Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999) was evoked to a larger extent when participants believed the 
robot’s behavior was controlled by a human, relative to the belief that it was only preprogrammed. 






follow-up EEG study (Wykowska, Wiese, et al., 2014), the authors showed that this effect is reflected 
at early stages of attentional processing while Özdem et al. (2017) identified – in an fMRI study – 
neural correlates of such belief manipulation.  
In a recent study, Thellman et al. (2017) asked a large number of people (N=93) with various 
backgrounds to interpret and explain behaviors displayed by two different agents (i.e. a human and a 
humanoid robot) involved in every-day activities (such as cleaning the floor or cooking). Specifically, 
the authors presented to their participants' pictures depicting the two agents doing the same actions 
and proposing, for each scenario, a possible explanation of the behavior. All explanations were 
referring to mental states both when the depicted agent was a robot, and when the depicted agent was 
a human. After observing each scenario, participants were asked to rate the explanation in terms of 
plausibility and to rate the general behavior displayed by the agent in terms of intentionality, 
desirability, and controllability. Results of their experiment showed that there was no difference 
between the two agents in terms of plausibility, intentionality, and desirability ratings between the 
conditions. However, when the behavior was displayed by the human agent, participants evaluated 
that the behavior was controlled by the agents themselves. On the contrary, when the behavior was 
displayed by the artificial agents, the behavior seemed controlled by external causes or was evaluated 
as programmed. Results of this experiment suggest that humans might adopt the intentional stance to 
some extent towards artificial agents as well. Yet, the existence of some differences in ratings 
supports the idea that different strategies are used to interpret artificial agents and human behaviors. 
Recently, Kamide et al. (2015) used the “Anshin” questionnaire to explore the reactions of more than 
nine hundred Japanese participants to videos depicting several robots. They discovered that aspects 
like perceived humanness, proficiency, and comfortability with a robot changed from robot to robot 
and from behavior to behavior. Specifically, they noticed that usually, the more the humanoid 
resembled a human in physical appearance, the higher participants were evaluating the comfort of the 
interaction and the proficiency of behaviors. In some situations, they found that exposure to more 
machine-like robots made humans feel stressed, but their results confirm that attributions towards 
artificial agents can fluctuate according to several factors. It is important to point out, however, that 
both Thellmann and colleagues as well as Kamide and colleagues used pictures or videos as stimuli 
in their experiments. Such “offline” experiments might not be sufficient to capture the social 
mechanisms involved during “live” interactions. In this context, it is crucial to address the question 
of whether behavioral parameters of an observed agent in more “live” naturalistic protocols affect the 
attribution of intentionality. In line with this hypothesis, Weiss and Bartneck (2015) pointed out that 






questionnaire are dramatically influenced by the interaction with a robot rather than by its physical 
appearance. 
In a recent study, Wykowska et al. (2015) designed two experiments that might help to clarify 
this aspect. In the first experiment, the authors showed their participants a non-humanoid robot 
(mechanical arms attached to a picture depicting the face of a human). Participants were asked to 
observe the behaviors of the robot, trying to identify which one of those behaviors was pre-
programmed and which one was remotely controlled by a confederate located in another room. In a 
second experiment, the same design was adopted, but the artificial agent was a humanoid robot NAO 
(SoftBank Robotics). In addition to the explicit discrimination task, the authors implemented in both 
experiments a visual letter discrimination paradigm, to collect an implicit measure of engagement. 
While participants were observing the behavior of the robot and rating its agency, they were also 
asked to discriminate between two letters (“T” or “F”) appearing on a screen located behind the robot. 
Results of both experiments suggest that humans are quite sensitive in detecting subtle differences 
between movements displayed by an artificial agent. Indeed, participants were able to discriminate 
accurately when a movement was remotely controlled by a confederate and when it was pre-
programmed. Furthermore, this study provides information about the implicit aspects of social 
interaction with artificial agents. The results suggested that when artificial agents show a certain 
degree of anthropomorphism, implicit social processes of engagement (in joint attention, in the case 
of this study) are activated.  
The recruitment of mindreading abilities to understand and predict the behavior displayed by 
an artificial agent seems to be modulated also by the knowledge that individuals possess regarding 
that specific agent. From an anthropological perspective, the limited knowledge our ancestors 
developed around natural phenomena, like the rain or the earthquakes, might be the reason why they 
attributed such phenomena to the “God’s mind”. When knowledge has become more developed and 
accessible, such interpretations have been substituted with physical explanations of the phenomena.  
Thus, it seems that when we are interacting or observing the behavior of an unknown (or not 
understandable) entity or phenomenon, we refer to the intentional model, as this might be the most 
available and default model that we possess. In fact, we are probably most experienced with 
intentional explanations, rather than scientific or technical explanations of various systems we 
observe in the environment. However, when our knowledge about an entity changes, the strategy we 
adopt to understand its behaviors changes as well. Similar reasoning can be applied to robots: if a 
person with no formal education who had never seen a robot before is exposed to a human-like robot, 






person who is experienced with robotics, or has acquired sufficient level of general education (physics 
and engineering included). This suggests that it is important to take into consideration levels of 
education and experience with robots and perhaps also various age groups when testing attitudes 
towards robots.  
Several factors might modulate individuals’ tendency to ascribe a mind towards robots. 
Indeed, in human-human interactions, countless factors affect the way we perceive and understand 
our conspecifics’ behavior, from personality traits to mood (Lopes et al., 2005; Cozolino, 2014). For 
example, it has been widely demonstrated that introverted people show difficulties in communicating 
(Sallinen‐Kuparinen et al., 1991; Schoemaker, Kalverboer 1994) and that people in a depressed mood 
tend to avoid social interaction (Young, Leyton 2002; Erber et al., 1996). Internal dispositions and 
states seem to be strictly connected with the attitude we show during our everyday life interactions. 
Therefore, we can speculate that as it happens for mindreading abilities (Platek et al., 2003; Nichols, 
Stich, 2003), intentional stance might be influenced also by self-awareness and self-reflective 
abilities. Few studies demonstrated that self-processing abilities affect mental state attribution to 
others, and, specifically, that psychiatric populations with deficits in self-awareness show 
impairments in the attribution of mental states to other agents (Williams, 2010; Moriguchi et al., 
2006). Studying whether such influences affect interactions with robots as well might help in the 
development of new explanatory models about human social abilities.  Although human-computer 
interaction (HCI) and human-robot interaction (HRI) studies are focused on designing artificial 
interfaces that can satisfy the needs of humans, understanding the way humans interact with artificial 
agents can also improve our knowledge about human cognition in general. Theories and models of 
human cognition can be tested using such technologies, offering new challenges (Dautenhahn, 2007). 
Cognitive architecture models, for example, are largely used to develop artificial intelligence (Kelley, 
2006; Metta et al., 2010). A case of particular interest might be the humanoid robot iCub, mentioned 
in the studies that we reported in previous sections. Its developers and designers took inspiration from 
models of cognitive architectures and implemented similar functions in the robot (Vernon et al., 
2007). Specifically, the synthetic architecture that is fitted to the iCub is composed of components 
such as a distributed multi-functional perceptual-motor network, a system of inhibitory modulation, 
and a system of action simulation. These systems originated from research and models proposed by 
neuroscientists, such as the presence in the brain of specific networks responsible for action selection 
(Chevalier, Deniau, 1990; Deniau, Chevalier 1985) or models about action simulation (Shanahan, 
2005).  Implementing a robot with such functions help researchers to clarify the ecological validity 






1.2.2.1 Impact on Human-Robot Interaction 
 
It is in this context that our theoretical questions about adopting the intentional stance, 
characteristics of robot behavior, or inter-individual differences need to be addressed. One of the most 
interesting questions is whether endowing robots with intentionality is crucial for evoking adoption 
of the intentional stance, or rather whether emulation of human-like behavior is sufficient. This 
question is analogous to the issue of the Turing test (Turing, 1950): Is it possible to produce responses 
in the Turing test that would make participants believe they are interacting with an intelligent agent, 
even though it is just an algorithm? Or rather, is it indispensable to have genuine intelligence in order 
to pass the Turing test. In simple words, is it possible to “fake” intelligence or intentionality thanks 
to very well-designed behavioral characteristics? At present, researchers are still far from developing 
artificial agents that can be perceived as human-like. Although some technologies provided with 
artificial intelligence might be able to pass the Turing test, humans are still fully aware of the 
boundaries between artificial agents and living beings (Kahn et al., 2006). The open question is 
whether it is only a matter of technological advances to “fake” intentionality, or is it in principle 
impossible.  
Evoking the adoption of the intentional stance towards artificial agents might be desirable in 
certain applications. For example, pathological traits, such as autistic traits, severely compromise 
social interaction and a multitude of studies demonstrated that individuals diagnosed with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) are often unable to deal with the complexity of human social interaction 
(Wing, Gould, 1979; Frith, 2003; McConnell, 2002). Specifically, children diagnosed with ASD often 
display less interest in behaviors aimed at generating and maintaining social interaction (Vivanti, 
Nuske, 2017). The severity, onset time, and specificity of such deficits captured the attention of 
clinicians and neuroscientists, stimulating the development of innovative evidence-based therapeutic 
approaches (Yates, Couteur, 2016; Fernandez et al., 2018). Recent literature suggests that robots 
might be efficiently used as clinical tools to enhance the social competencies of children affected 
with social impairments (Diehl et al, 2012; Feil-Seifer, Mataric, 2010; Kajopoulos et al., 2015; 
Carlson et al., 2018). Several studies demonstrated that the advantages of using such artificial agents 
rely on their physical appearance and the extensive control that clinicians and scientists can exert on 
their behaviors (Scassellati et al., 2012; Robins et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2008). Robots may represent 
a safe, predictable, and coherent environment to train social interaction skills in people that display 
difficulties in interaction with other humans (Dautenhahn, Werry 2004). It seems that artificial agents 






example, in 2013, Zheng et al. demonstrated that after only four sessions with a specific rehabilitation 
protocol carried out with a robot, children with ASD improve their social skills (Zheng et al., 2013). 
Concerns might be raised about the development of a certain social dependence that the patient can 
develop toward assistive technology. However, some studies demonstrated that learning acquired 
during the activities with robots is automatically transferred to everyday-life activities and interaction 
with other humans (Francois et al., 2009; Robins et al., 2005). We speculate that robot behaviors that 
evoke the adoption of intentional stance shall be even more efficient in training social skills that can 
be then transferred to human interactions. This is because adopting an intentional stance towards 
other humans is a natural process in the social interactions of typically developing individuals. 
Difficulty in effortless adopting of the intentional stance towards others is likely part of the problem 
in social skill deficiencies (Griffin & Dennett, 2008). Therefore, evoking an intentional stance in 
therapies with robots should have beneficial effects for transferring the skills trained with robots to 
interactions with humans. 
Apart from the application of social robots to healthcare, social robots are supposed to have a 
potential application also in elderly care. Robots that are designed for elderly care provide support in 
everyday-life activities (eating, bathing, etc.), mobility, housekeeping, and monitoring the health 
condition of the user. Several researchers focused their attention on consequences caused by the 
introduction of assistive robots (Pollak et al., 2002; Graf et al., 2004) and assistive smart 
environments (Bahadori et al., 2003) in elderly care. Results showed that the introduction of robots 
in elderly care does not only improve the quality of life of people in terms of perceived autonomy but 
also in terms of psychological wellbeing (Broekens et al., 2009; Sharkey, Sharkey 2012). This is 
because such robots can provide social feedback to the user, and can be treated as “companions”. 
Companion robots seem to increase positive mood while reducing the perception of loneliness and 
stress (for a review, see Broekens et al., 2009 and Bemelmans et al., 2012). Results emphasize the 
usefulness of robots that can induce some degree of social attunement. These applications will be 
needed in the near future, considering that the elderly population is constantly increasing, while the 
availability of healthcare professionals is decreasing (WHO, Investing in the health workforce 
enables stronger health systems, in the Fact sheet. 2007: Belgrade, Copenhagen). To maximize the 
efficiency of healthcare professionals, repetitive and frustrating activities can be assigned to assistive 
robots. In parallel, this would allow lower institutionalization of medical care and higher autonomy 
for individuals. Also in the case of elderly care, robots that evoke adoption of intentional stance might 
prove more beneficial than those that not, due to the potential higher degree of bonding.  However, 






application of robots was industry. Recently, however, domestic robots started entering our homes. 
Some authors question the safety granted by new technologies, in terms of producing reliable and 
non-harmful behavior (Denning et al., 2009; Sharkey & Sharkey, 2010), others point out the issues 
related to psychological risks, such as social isolation (Sparrow, 2006; Hampton et al., 2009) or 
addiction to technology (Veruggio, 2005). Finally, one of the most discussed controversial aspects 
related to robots is the issue of privacy. Privacy is an ancient concept, developed by ancient Greeks 
as a distinction between public and private life. Nowadays, privacy is conceived as the possibility of 
controlling one’s data. Recently, privacy management has caught the attention of media and 
legislative authorities. although no robot or artificial intelligence was involved in the 2018 scandal of 
Facebook, Facebook admitted that information of eighty-seven million users was given to Cambridge 
Analytica without their permission. If we think about assistive and domestic robots, one of the 
necessary requirements for them to function adequately in their role is collecting, processing, and 
potentially recording data from users. Some of the commercial house assistants, like google home, 
need to save information gathered during the interaction with the user in the cloud. In the context of 
the intentional stance, perhaps also in this area, if robots induce adoption of the intentional stance, 
they might be more likely to collect more personal or intimate information from the user, relative to 
robots that would be treated only as mechanistic artifacts. This is because humans might be more 
inclined to reveal their intimate information towards agents that are perceived as intentional (to make 
it more evident: we are certainly more likely to confide in another human than in an artifact such as 
a coffee machine). Thus, designing robots that evoke the adoption of the intentional stance in users 
might have consequences for the type of data that is recorded and potentially stored. Companies 
producing robots for daily home use must guarantee privacy protection of such information, to avoid 
third parties accessing those data without the consent of the user. 
In this context, it is crucial to inform users about all the aspects involved in interacting with 
technology. The more we aim to introduce technology in everyday life, the more we need to inform 
users about the potential risks, as well as benefits provided by having access to such tools. Giving as 
much information as possible to users, and educating them on how to use technology would on the 
one hand circumvent certain fears produced often by popular culture (e.g., the fear of robots “taking 
over the world”) and would reduce the unnecessary hype related to AI and robotics that is based on 
misconceptions about what AI is capable of. Some authors, for instance, claimed that assistive robots 
are unethical since their effectiveness depends on deceiving users creating an illusion of 
companionship (Sparrow, 2002; Turkle et al., 2006; Wallach, 2009). However, it is crucial to avoid 






intentional stance towards artificial agents might be beneficial in some contexts, and is not necessarily 
something to be afraid of, given how automatic and default this mechanism is (Heider, Simmel, 1944; 
Gray et al., 2007; Wiese, Metta, Wykowska, 2017). However, it is generally important to provide 
sufficient information about robot technologies to all users, to avoid potential risks of misconceptions, 
misuse of private data as well as unnecessary fears related to fantasies created by popular culture. 
Studying the conditions and consequences of implementing human-like behaviors on artificial 
agents that can potentially induce the adoption of intentional stance is fascinating from a theoretical 
perspective, and extremely important for the future of our societies.  From the theoretical perspective, 
it can be informative concerning the mechanisms of human social cognition – how flexible is our 
socio-cognitive system. How far can the human brain go in extending mechanisms of social cognition 
from natural to artificial agents? What consequences does adopting the intentional stance have for 
other (perhaps more implicit) mechanisms of social cognition? Can we develop models of 
intentionality for artificial systems? Is endowing artificial systems with intentionality necessary for 
evoking adoption of intentional stance or is it sufficient to emulate human-like behaviors?  
From the perspective of applications of robots and future societal impact, it is important to discuss 
whether and when treating artificial agents as intentional systems is desirable. It is also important to 
keep in mind that proper information for the end-users regarding the capabilities of the artificial 
systems can avoid misconceptions and hype on the one hand and fears and risks on the other. All 
these issues need to be discussed not only among the scientific community but also with the general 
public. This would allow strengthening people’s awareness about the technology, avoiding misuse 
and misjudgment.  
1.2.2.2 The development of the InStance questionnaire2 
 
In order to address the question of whether humans adopt the intentional stance toward a 
robot, Marchesi et al. recently created a tool (the Intentional Stance Questionnaire, ISQ) that should 
probe the adoption of intentional stance toward a specific robot platform, a humanoid robot (Marchesi 
et al., 2019). The aim of their study was twofold: (1) Developing a tool that would allow for measuring 
whether humans would adopt, in some contexts, the intentional stance toward a robot; (2) Exploring 
if humans would sometimes adopt the intentional stance toward robots. Each item of ISQ consisted 
of pictorial scenarios, depicting the iCub robot interacting with objects and/or humans. Each item 
included two sentences, in addition to the scenario. One of the sentences was always explaining 
                                                 
2 Part of this paragraph was published as Marchesi, S., Ghiglino, D., Ciardo, F., Perez-Osorio, J., Baykara, E., & Wykowska, A. (2019). Do we adopt 






iCub’s behavior referring to the design stance (i.e., mechanistic explanation), whereas the other was 
always describing iCub’s behavior referring to mental states (i.e., mentalistic explanation). 
Participants were asked to move the slider towards the sentence that better described the scenario 
according to them. Results of this study indicated that participants showed a slight bias toward the 
mechanistic explanation when they were asked to evaluate robot actions, which is in line with the 
essence of the concept of the intentional stance (Dennett, 1987). The authors speculate that, to 
understand the behavior of a robot, humans are more prone to adopt the design, rather than the 
intentional, stance – and this is in spite of the natural tendency to anthropomorphize unknown entities 
(Epley et al., 2007). However, and interestingly, the design stance descriptions were not always 
chosen by their participants to explain the iCub’s actions. This indicates that participants have (at 
times) also chosen mentalistic explanations of the given scenarios. Therefore, in principle, it might 
be possible to induce adoption of intentional stance toward artificial agents. The likelihood of 
adopting the intentional stance might depend on the context in which the robot is observed, its 
behavioral characteristics (e.g., contingency of its behavior on participant’s behavior, cf. Willemse et 
al., 2018), cultural background (attitude toward humanoid robots is strongly associated with culture 
(for a review see Haring et al., 2014) and also individual differences of participants. Indeed, humans 
possess many types of vocabulary for describing nature of mindless entities, and for describing 
intentional agents, but might lack a way of describing what is between the two (Davidson, 1999). 
This is also in line with Dennett’s proposal (Dennett, 1981) of intentional stance: when we find a 
model that is most efficient to explain a behavior, we take its prototypical explanation, and do not 
necessarily search for explanations that are in the fuzzy zones of in-between models. In each scenario 
of the ISQ questionnaire, the robot was always the same, but the action and the environment/context 
around it changed across conditions, modulating participants’ ratings. However, the ISQ ratings 
became quite polarized once there was a bias toward either the mentalistic or the mechanistic 
explanation. This might be a consequence of a general tendency of people to form discrete categories 
rather than continuous fuzzy concepts (Dietrich and Markman, 2003) but it does also suggest the 
existence of a certain degree of flexibility that allows humans to shift between such categories. Based 
on such results, the authors argue that the adoption of mentalistic or mechanistic models to explain a 
robot’s action do not rely only on intrinsic properties of the agent, but also on contingent factors 
(Waytz et al., 2010) and on the observer’s dispositions (Dennett, 1990), in a similar way as it occurs 
for human-likeness and anthropomorphism (Fink, 2012). The study proposed by Marchesi et al. 
showed that it is possible to induce adoption of the intentional stance toward the iCub robot at times, 






exact factors (individual difference, cultural context, specific characteristics of robot appearance or 
behavior) that influence the adoption of intentional stance. 
1.3 Rationale of the project 
 
In short, individuals spontaneously generate representations of other agents’ goals, desires, and 
intentions. This natural tendency enables individuals to understand human behavior in terms of 
underlying mental states, making the behavior meaningful (Fonagy, 2018). However, while 
interacting with artifacts (i.e. computers, smartphones, etc.), humans usually tend to rely more on 
their functionality and design rather than on their intentional states (Dennett, 1971). This hypothesis 
might not hold in the case of complex artificial agents, such as robots, which create the illusion of 
human-likeness, due to their physical appearance and due to the behavior that they can display. 
Indeed, the design of artificial agents able to display human-like behaviors can be fundamental to 
increase the naturalness perceived by the human counterpart during the interaction and, consequently, 
facilitate social attunement. Several characteristics have been identified as crucial to enhance 
engagement during the interaction with artificial agents, and one of these characteristics is variability 
(Gielniak, Liu, & Thomaz, 2013). The advent of complex robotic systems allows researchers to 
implement highly variable human behaviors in artificial agents, to study more in detail on which 
information humans rely the most when evaluating biological motion. Understanding mechanisms of 
human perception of synthetic motion can facilitate, in the future, human-robot interaction (Heider, 
F., & Simmel, 1944). Embedding social robots with human-like behaviors may also lead to the 
adoption of mindreading strategies, and, as a cascade effect, to attune (on a social level) with the 
artificial agent. Studies on biological motion perception demonstrated that motion cues influence 
social attunement towards artificial agents, triggering even empathetic and mindreading processes 
(Miller & Saygin, 2013; Frith & Frith, 1999). However, it is still unclear to what extent it is possible 
to manipulate the perception that humans have toward an artificial agent by manipulating the 
behaviors displayed by the latter. Thus, we designed a series of human-robot interaction scenarios 
aimed at testing the tendency to attribute human-likeness and intentions towards artificial agents. We 
used the humanoid robot iCub (Metta et al., 2008) both in real-time interaction and in screen-based 
experiments. Through the adoption of a systematic approach, we exposed large sets of participants to 
subtle manipulations of the robot’s behavior and tested their reactions using explicit and implicit 
measures, combined with questionnaires assessing their individual differences. Importantly, we based 






Such a comprehensive approach to the topic allows for a deeper understanding of the perceptual and 
cognitive processes that are involved during the interaction between humans and artificial agents.  
 The first two studies, reported in Publication I and Publication II, examine individuals’ 
sensitivity to hints of human-likeness displayed by an avatar of the iCub robot and by the same 
embodied robot, respectively. For these two studies, we adopted a self-report questionnaire to assess 
participants’ tendency to attribute anthropomorphic traits and intentions towards artificial agents. In 
the subsequent studies, reported in Publication III and Publication IV, we examined whether hints of 
human-likeness affect individuals’ attentional engagement during the visual processing of the iCub 
robot’s behavior. To this end, we combined self-report questionnaires used in the first two studies 
with implicit measures (i.e. eye-tracking data). 
Publication I  
The first study of the PhD thesis, reported in Publication I, aimed at investigating whether 
implementing robots with behaviors reflecting attentional capture modulate individuals’ perception 
of its human-likeness. Thus, we implemented pre-recorded humans’ behaviors in a virtual version of 
the iCub robot. Such recordings were acquired through an inertial sensor mounted on the head of a 
group of participants (N = 20), while they were engaged in a solitaire card game task, and a series of 
distracting stimuli were presented. Behavioral reactions of participants were extracted and 
implemented in the iCub simulator. We examined whether parameters of the movement implemented 
in the robot (i.e. angle amplitude, overall time spent on a target) modulate participants’ ratings of its 
human-likeness, and potential correlation with sociodemographic factors (i.e. gender, age). Our 
results suggested that the temporal dynamic characterizing the behaviors affected individuals’ ratings 
more than spatial information. Thus, we concluded that it is fundamental to take into account the 
temporal profile of behaviors implemented in artificial agents if the aim is to make them appear 
human-like. 
Publication II 
The second study, reported in Publication II, aimed at understanding human processing of subtle hints 
of human-likeness displayed by an embodied artificial agent (i.e. the iCub robot). The paradigm 
consisted of an observation of the robot and was aimed to assess whether humans can perceive subtle 
differences in the robot's behavior when they have either no information regarding the behavior itself 
or explicit information regarding the process of implementation of the behavior. We exposed 






study reported as Publication I) or in a machine-like way (this behavior was pre-programmed to be 
stereotypical and repetitive). Participants were asked to complete several self-report questionnaires 
after each session with the robot. Then, data collected after each session were compared, as well as 
differences between the two groups of participants that received different information. Our results 
highlighted a crucial role of individuals’ knowledge on their sensitivity to human-based behavior 
displayed by an artificial agent, as well as on their attribution of anthropomorphic traits towards the 
same agent. We concluded that individuals’ knowledge-related biases might override perceptual 
evidence of human-likeness when observing the behavior of a robot. 
Publication III 
The third study, reported in Publication III, examined behavioral correlates of perceptual processing 
of a humanoid face during a screen-based paradigm. In particular, the study focused on perceptual 
and attentional processing underpinning human-robot interaction. The hypothesis is that 
decomposing the robot behavior in its single components might lead to a better comprehension of the 
perceptual processes elicited in the human during the observation of robot behavior. The present study 
aimed to combine self-report and eye-tracking measures to understand human explicit and implicit 
processes associated with a systematic variation of the same robot’s behavior. As a secondary aim, 
we assessed the discrepancy between explicit and implicit measures of engagement, to further 
investigate the processes associated with the interpretation of humanoid behavior. Our results pointed 
out that individuals display higher attentional engagement when the robot displays a human-like 
behavior than when the artificial agent is behaving mechanically. Additionally, we found that 
individuals tend to attribute higher ratings of human-likeness to slow, rather than fast, behaviors. We 
concluded that implementing human-like behaviors in an artificial agent might facilitate attentional 
processes required for communicating with it, although explicit attributions of human-likeness 
towards it might depend upon other factors (i.e. temporal dynamics of the behavior).  
Publication IV 
The final study reported in this thesis, Publication IV (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2), was aimed 
at investigating whether humans are facilitated in the visual processing of information conveyed by 
a human or by a robot. We manipulated both agents’ behaviors in order to display either active, 
mentalistic behaviors, or passive, repetitive behaviors. In Experiment 1, we combined eye-tracking 
and performance measures with self-report data, to understand the relationship between visual 






displayed in a screen-based experiment. In Experiment 2, we used the same set of stimuli in an online 
study to evaluate individuals’ tendency to attribute anthropomorphic traits based on the behavior 
displayed by the two agents (i.e. the human and the iCub). Our results showed that individuals’ 
attention was more engaged when observing seemingly intentional behaviors than when observing 
mechanical ones. Furthermore, individuals recognized intentional behaviors more accurately than 
mechanical ones. We concluded that, among human-based behaviors, the ones showing a clear intent 
spontaneously engage individuals’ attention, and modulate human-likeness attribution towards the 
agent displaying them.  
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2.1 Publication I: Attributing human-likeness to an avatar: the role of 
time and space in the perception of biological motion 
 
 
Ghiglino D.1-2, De Tommaso D.1 and Wykowska A.1 
 
1 Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia, Via Morego, 30, 16163, Genova, Italy 








Despite well-developed cognitive control mechanisms in most adult healthy humans, attention can 
still be captured by irrelevant distracting stimuli occurring in the environment. However, when it 
comes to artificial agents, such as humanoid robots, one might assume that their attention is 
“programmed” to follow a task, thus, being distracted by attention-capturing stimuli would not be 
expected. We were interested in whether a behavior that reflects attentional capture in a humanoid 
robot would increase its perception as human-like. We implemented human behaviors in a virtual 
version of the iCub robot. Twenty participants’ head movements were recorded, through an inertial 
sensor, during a solitaire card game, while a series of distracting videos were presented on a screen 
in their peripheral field of view. Eight participants were selected, and their behavioral reactions (i.e. 
inertial sensor coordinates, etc.) were extracted and implemented in the simulator. In Experiment 2, 
twenty-four new participants were asked to rate the human-likeness of the avatar movements. We 
examined whether movement parameters (i.e. angle amplitude, overall time spent on a distractor) 
influenced participants’ ratings of human-likeness and if there was any correlation with 
sociodemographic factors (i.e. gender, age). Results showed a gender effect on human-likeness 
ratings (t=2.425, p=.024). Thus, we computed a GLM analysis including gender as a covariate. The 
main effect of the time of movement (F=9.179, p=.006) surviving Bonferroni correction (p<.05) was 
found. We conclude that humans rely more on temporal than on spatial information when evaluating 
properties (specifically, human-likeness) of the biological motion of humanoid-shaped avatars. 
Keywords: Human-likeness of robot behavior, Biological Motion, Humanoid robots. 
2.1.2 Introduction 
 
In designing artificial agents that are to appear human-like to increase perceive naturalness and 
facilitate social attunement, many researchers address the issue of creating human-like behavior. 
Several characteristics have been identified, and one crucial characteristic is variability (Gielniak, 
Liu, Thomaz, 2013): behavioral observations demonstrate that humans never display the same 
behavior twice. For example, several studies demonstrated that subjects tend to adopt unique patterns 
of kinematic strategies to attend the very same target (Freedman and Sparks, 2000; Stergiou and 
Decker, 2011; Desmurget et al., 1995). The recent advent of complex humanoid systems, allow 
researchers to implement fragmentized human behaviors in artificial agents, to study more in detail 
on which information humans rely the most when evaluating biological motion. Furthermore, a 
deeper understanding of the human perception of synthetic motion will facilitate, in the future, 






interacting with other mammals (Fox, 2006), easily understand goals, motivation, and beliefs behind 
human-like behaviors (Blakemore and Decety, 2001), also relying on motion clarity. It is not clear 
whether artificial motion patterns of a robot would be as easily understood and predicted. Therefore, 
it is of high importance to examine what parameters of robot behavior make it well-understood by 
human users. Evidence from literature pointed out that motion cues might influence the social 
attunement perceived towards artificial agents, enhancing even empathetic and mentalizing processes 
(Miller and Saygin, 2013; Heider and Simmel, 1944, Frith and Frith, 1999). Starting with observing 
and recording human motion, several techniques can be used to transfer movement parameters in 
artificial agents (Pollard et al., 2002; Lee and Lee, 2006; Aggarwal and Cai, 1999). However, given 
the huge variability of humans’ motion, it is still unclear which components of observed behaviors 
affect the most perception of human-likeness. The projection of human motion in a simulated 
environment might be a suitable method to study systematically these factors. 
 
2.1.2.1 Aim of the study 
  
The goal of the present study was to investigate how human participants perceive biological 
movement displayed in an artificial agent in terms of human-likeness. We selected an attention-
capture scenario because attention capture seems to be a very human-like phenomenon. Humans (and 
several other animal species) have developed mechanisms to attend relevant events in the 
environment. The “decision” of the brain to attend to a given event in the environment is made 
through a combination of bottom-up characteristics of the stimulus (e.g., the salience of the stimulus) 
and internal top-down factors of the agent (e.g., bias towards emotional stimuli, or a particular sound 
of, for example, one’s own child’s voice). However, in many cases, the brain attends to stimuli that 
“capture” attention through their salience, although this disrupts a given task at hand. Think, for 
example, of driving. The driver should be focused on the road ahead of him/her and on keeping the 
car in the assumed lane. However, if there is a very loud distracting sound or bright light flashing in 
the peripheral vision, the driver might be attracted by this event, and in consequence lose focus on 
the task, potentially causing an accident. Therefore, although evolutionarily adaptive, the attentional 
capture phenomenon can be disruptive for a task. In this context, one might think that artificial 
intelligence should be better adapted to the successful completion of a given task, and not allow being 
distracted by peripheral events that might result in sub-optimal performance in a task. We reasoned, 
that “being distracted” – especially with variable ways of reacting to the distracting stimuli might be 






robot with behaviors reflecting attentional capture would make it be perceived as human-like, and 
which particular aspects of the behavior would be crucial for attributions of human-likeness. To this 
aim, we recorded human head and eye movement during an attentional capture paradigm. The 
recorded behaviors were filtered, and eight different movement profiles were implemented on an 
iCub (Metta et al., 2008) simulator. Then, a group of participants was asked to rate the human-likeness 
of the movements of the simulator. 
2.1.3 Materials and Methods 
 
2.1.3.1 Attentional capture with humans 
 
Selection of Distracting Stimuli. Sixty HD quality videos were selected from YouTube accordingly 
to the following criteria: (1) presence of a single salient sound in the whole sequence (i.e. a phone 
ring, a woman laugh, a door slam, etc.); (2) absence of inappropriate contents (i.e. politic, racism, 
sexism, etc.); (3) more than 100 M views. Selected videos were edited using Apple Final Cut Pro, in 
order to make all of them last for the same amount of time (twenty seconds). Fifty-five anonymous 
Italian participants were asked to rate the emotional content of the videos through an online platform 
(soscisurvey.de, Leiner, 2018), using a ten-point Likert scale (0=not emotional at all; 10=strongly 
emotional). One subgroup (n=26) was asked to rate only the audio tracks of the videos. The other 
subgroup (N=30) was asked to rate both the audio and the visual component of the videos. After 
collecting the data, the ratings of the two groups were compared. Four of the sixty initial stimuli were 
excluded because of the inconsistency between the ratings of the two groups. The remaining fifty-six 
videos were categorized into “Affective” and “Non-affective” stimuli, using the median score of the 
raters as a cutoff value between the two categories. Eighteen videos were then extracted, according 
to the following criteria: the nine with the lowest score (“Non-affective” videos) and the nine with 
the highest score (“Affective” videos). By using Apple Final Cut Pro, audio tracks of the final 
eighteen videos were manipulated, in order to increase the salience of one single sound per video (i.e. 
the phone ring, the woman laugh, the door slam). Furthermore, we edited the videos in order to ensure 
that the physical properties of the sounds (i.e. volume and sampling rate, 44.1 kHz) were consistent. 
For each video, the volume of the single salient sound was increased, while all the other sounds were 
reduced. The final pool of videos was implemented in an attentional capture paradigm as distracting 
stimuli. 
 







Participants. Twenty-two healthy young adults (9 females; 19-34 years of age) were recruited. All 
participants were native Italian language speakers with no history of psychiatric or neurological 
diagnosis, substance abuse, or psychoactive medication. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and reported no history of hearing impairment. Experimental protocols followed the 
ethical standards laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki and procedures were approved by the local 
Ethics Committee (Comitato Etico Regione Liguria). Each participant provided written informed 
consent to participate in the experiment. Participants were not informed regarding the purpose of the 
study before the experiment but were debriefed upon completion. 
Experimental design. Participants were seated in a sound-attenuated experimental booth with dimmed 
light, in front of a notebook screen (HP Stream 14-ax011nl, 1366 x 768) (Fig. 1).  
 
 
Fig. 1. Experimental setup: (a) participant is engaged in a solitary game on the laptop; (b) 
participant reacts to a distracting stimulus. 
They were instructed to perform a solitary card game (spider one-suit) on the notebook and to pay 
attention to the game. While participants were engaged in the card game, distracting stimuli were 
presented in the far periphery of their field of view (100° on the right, 227 cm of distance), on a 
second computer screen (DELL S2716DG, 2560 x 1440 pixels). The audio tracks of the distracting 
stimuli were played through loudspeakers (Logitech LGT-Z130), located under the second screen. 






Participants’ eye movements were recorded throughout the entire duration of the experiment with a 
mobile eye-tracking device (TobiiAB, 2015). Head movements were recorded using an inertial sensor 
(Bosch Sensortec BNO055 Intelligent 9-Axis Absolute Orientation Sensor (Sensortec, 2014) 
mounted on the eye-tracker and integrated into the OpenSesame experiment. We implemented a 
periodic task, running at 50Hz, that requests every 20ms the Euler angles to the inertial sensor. The 
absolute values of these angles, together with the sampling timestamp (Timestamp, Yaw, Pitch, and 
Roll) were saved in a .csv file, one for each distractor stimulus. Specifically, the periodic task was 
synchronized with the video stimuli, so that the duration of each inertial measure was aligned with 
the duration of the video. For each experiment, we collected 18 sessions for each participant, in total 
360 .csv files. 
Data Analyses. Participants’ data were extracted from the eye-tracker and the inertial sensor through 
Tobii Pro Lab and OpenSesame, respectively. Two participants were excluded due to the poor quality 
of their data. Participants’ reactions to distracting stimuli were defined as head rotations of at least 
30° on the yaw axis (horizontal plane) of the inertial sensor. Reactions of participants were treated 
and analyzed as a count variable. For each subject, three final parameters were extracted: (1) total 
amount of distractions during the whole experiment, (2) total amount of distractions that occurred 
during “Affective” stimuli, and (3) total amount of distractions occurred during “Non-affective” 
stimuli. A Wilcoxon matched-pairs test was used to verify a potential difference between “Affective” 
and “Non-affective” conditions. Furthermore, to explore gender differences in distractibility among 
participants, a Fisher exact test was used to compare males and females, separately for “Affective” 
and “Non-affective” conditions. In order to apply the Fisher Exact Test, the number of reactions was 
converted into a relative percentage estimated on the single subject. Finally, a binomial test (n=20, 
p=50%, 1-α=.95) was used to identify the most distracting stimuli of our pool. Two sounds (a gun 
shot and a woman’s orgasm) survived the .95 threshold, meaning that at least 70% of our sample 
reacted to sound with a distraction).  
 
2.1.3.3 Implementation of humans’ behaviors in an iCub simulator 
 
Selection of behaviors. During the attentional capture paradigm, fifteen participants reacted to the 
sound “gun shot” and fourteen participants reacted to the sound “woman orgasm”. Thus, we took into 
consideration the resulting twenty-nine reactions. For each reaction, we extracted two main 
parameters: (1) amplitude (°) of the movement; (2) time (s) spent on the distractor. The first parameter 
represented the angle of rotation of the head toward the distracting screen and was calculated as the 






video and the maximum distance reached on the horizontal plane (yaw axis of the inertial sensor) 
during the same temporal window. The time spent on the distractor was estimated as the time spent 
by the subject on a point of the horizontal plane exceeding two standard deviations from the average 
position of the head. Setting this high threshold allowed us to extract thirteen reactions from the initial 
pool.  Then, the median value of the amplitude (Mdn=51,108°) and the median value of the time 
spent on the distractor (Mdn=1,664 s) were calculated and used as a cutoff to classify the reactions. 
Specifically, reactions were divided into four categories, accordingly to the combination of the 
amplitude of the movement and the time spent on the distractor, namely: 
Amplitude and time above the median; (2) Amplitude above the median and time below the median; 
(3) Amplitude and time below the median; (4) Amplitude below the median and time below the 
median. 
For each condition, the two most representative reactions were extracted (one for the “gun shot” and 
one for the “woman orgasm”). Eight reactions from eight different participants were selected as the 
final pool. 
Reproduction of the head movements on the iCub simulator. The iCub simulator (Fig. 1) has been 
designed to reproduce the physics and the dynamics of the robot.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Example of the iCub simulator. 
It has been implemented collecting data directly from the robot design specifications in order to 
achieve a replication as accurately as possible. Moreover, the software architecture is the same used 
to control the physical robot. Specifically, we decided to use the Direct Position Control algorithm 
(see http://wiki.icub.org/images/c/cf/ICub_Control_Modes_1_1.pdf) for sending the joint positions 
to the iCub head. According to the specifications available in the iCub Wiki 
(http://wiki.icub.org/wiki/ICub_joints#Head_2.0), the head joints are the ones with indexes 0, 1, and 






recorded with the inertial sensor to get relative angles concerning the initial head pose at the onset of 
the stimulus. In such a way, we transferred on the robot the relative rotation due to the distractor, 
assuming always the same starting head pose. The experiment was designed to guarantee, with good 
approximation, this assumption. In fact, the participants were always looking straight at the screen 
whenever a video stimulus occurred. We excluded all the other recordings not satisfying this 
condition. This preprocessing of the data was enough to reproduce on the iCub simulator the head 
movements using the Direct Position Control algorithm. This control technique is used whenever 
joint positions are sent at a high frequency because no trajectory generation in between is needed.    
 
2.1.3.4 Human-likeness survey 
 
Participants. Twenty-four participants (13 females; 26-60 years of age) completed an online survey 
evaluating the human-likeness of the iCub simulator. Data collection was conducted in accordance 
with the ethical standards laid down in the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association 
(Declaration of Helsinki), procedures were approved by the regional ethical committee (Comitato 
Etico Regione Liguria). 
Experimental design. Eight videos of six seconds each were recorded from the simulator. Videos 
were then uploaded on an online platform (soscisurvey.de) and associated with the following 
question: “On a scale from 1 (extremely mechanistic) to 10 (extremely human-like), how would you 
rate iCub behaviors in terms of human-likeness?”. Each video and the associated question was 
presented ten times during the survey, mixed with the other items in random order. Participants rated 
the human-likeness of the simulations, relying only on motion information. They were not informed 
that the behaviors were all based on previous recordings of humans’ motions, but they were debriefed 
after the survey. To investigate whether the ratings were influenced by subjective factors, participants 
were also asked to complete the Empathy Quotient (EQ) questionnaire [Baron-Cohen] after the 
survey. 
Data analyses. A two-sample T-Test was used to assess gender differences in our sample’s ratings. 
Pearson’s correlations were applied to evaluate possible correlations between participants’ global 
ratings and subjective measures (EQ). 
To explore how the components of biological motion (amplitude of the movement and time spent on 
the distractor) affect ratings of human-likeness, statistical analyses were applied. The amplitude of 






in the context of the General Linear Model (GLM). The gender of our participants was included in 
the model as a nuisance covariate. Post hoc effects were estimated by calculating the Bonferroni test.  
2.1.4 Results 
 
2.1.4.1 Recordings of human behaviors 
 
Statistical analyses performed on the average number of reactions across participants revealed a 
significant difference between Non-affective and Affective stimuli. 
Specifically, the Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test detected a significant difference (N=20, T=3.5, 
Z=3.789, p<.001) between the average number of reactions that occurred during Non Affective 
stimuli (M=2.30, SD=2.00) and Affective stimuli (M=5.60, SD=2.46) (Fig. 2). 
For both Non-affective and Affective conditions, Fisher Exact Test revealed no significant effect of 
gender (p>.05) on distractibility during the experiment (Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 3. Differences between males and females on the percentage of reaction displayed during Non-
affective (Non-aff) and Affective (Aff) stimuli; vertical bars denote standard deviation of the data. 
 







The two-sample T-Test revealed a significant difference (T=2.425, p<.05) of gender on the human-
likeness ratings, pointing out that females (M= 6.39, SD=1.38) usually rate higher human-likeness 
than males (M=4.90, SD=1.64) (Fig. 4). No correlation was found between ratings and subjects’ 
Empathy Quotient scores. 
The analyses modeled in the General Linear Model revealed no significant interaction between the 
amplitude of the movement and time spent on the distractor (F=0.48, p=.50). Furthermore, no main 
effect was found for the amplitude (F=0.18, p=.68), although results showed a significant main effect 
of the time spent on the distractor (F=9.18, p<.01) (Fig. 5) surviving Bonferroni correction (p<.01). 




Fig. 5. The main effect of the “Time spent on distractor” on human-likeness ratings; vertical bars 
denote confidence intervals; Cousineau procedure was applied for correcting bars for within-
participants comparisons. 
2.1.5 General discussion 
Our study aimed to examine parameters of biological motion implemented on a humanoid robot 
avatar that determine the perceived human-likeness of the motion. 
In Experiment 1 we focused on the recording of human behaviors. We recorded participants’ head 
and eye movements during an attentional paradigm. Before implementing the recorded data on an 






differences between participants (males vs females) or between conditions (Non-affective vs 
Affective) affected our results. No difference was found between males and females, suggesting that 
we could use all participants’ recordings regardless of their gender for subsequent implementation. 
At the same time, we found a difference between our experimental conditions. Specifically, results 
showed that Affective stimuli (i.e. a laugh, a cry, a scream, etc.) elicited more frequent reactions 
compared to Non-affective ones (i.e. a phone ring, a metal drop, a door closing, etc.). We combined 
this result within the binomial test, to extract the most representative behaviors recorded during the 
attentional capture paradigm.  
Then, eight behaviors of different participants were selected, extracted, and, subsequently, 
implemented on an iCub simulator. An independent sample of participants was asked to rate the 
human likeness of the robot in the simulator, relying only on motion information. Our results showed 
that females ratings of human-likeness were generally higher than males’ ratings. This might suggest 
that females might be more prone to attribute human likeness than males to a robot simulator, 
regardless of the physical properties of the movement displayed. In line with previous research (Bisio 
et al., 2014), we also confirmed that humans, when asked to judge biological motion, rely more on 
temporal, than on spatial information. Interestingly, although all movements were copied from human 
behaviors, the average rating of participants was around 5.48. This might suggest that regardless of 
the naturalness of the movement, humans are still biased by additional visual information (the robot 
shape) when evaluating biological motion. Furthermore, a large variability was detected between 
participants’ ratings. Despite the lack of correlation between the Empathy Quotient and the ratings, 
we hypothesize the existence of personality traits that might influence participants’ ratings. Further 
studies should investigate which factors might explain this variability. 
2.1.6 Conclusion 
Our results showed that temporal features of a movement are crucial in the perceived human-likeness 
of a movement exhibited by an avatar of a humanoid robot. Thus, particular attention shall be paid to 
temporal trajectory when using avatars (or robots) to reproduce humans’ behavior. Furthermore, large 
variability detected in participants’ ratings of human-likeness and the gender difference suggests the 
necessity of investigating more in detail individual differences, especially when exploring attribution 
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Designing artificial agents that can closely imitate human behavior, might influence humans in 
perceiving them as intentional agents. Nonetheless, the factors that are crucial for an artificial agent 
to be perceived as an animated and anthropomorphic being still need to be addressed. In the current 
study, we investigated some of the factors that might affect the perception of a robot's behavior as 
human-like or intentional. To meet this aim, seventy-nine participants were exposed to two different 
behaviors of a humanoid robot under two different instructions. Before the experiment, participants' 
biases towards robotics as well as their personality traits were assessed. Our results suggest that 
participants’ sensitivity to human-likeness relies more on their expectations rather than on perceptual 
cues.  
Keywords: Human-robot interaction, humanoid robot, social cognition, intentional stance, mental 
states, instruction manipulation 
2.2.2 Introduction 
 
In everyday life, we are frequently exposed to different smart technologies. From our smartphones to 
avatars in computer games, and soon perhaps humanoid robots, we are surrounded by artificial agents 
created to interact with us. Already during the design phase of an artificial agent, engineers often 
endow it with functions aimed to promote interaction and engagement with it, ranging from its 
“communicative” abilities to the movements it produces. The idea that an artificial agent able to 
behave like a human being would boost the spontaneity and naturalness of interaction is well 
supported by the literature (Ficocelli, Terao, Nejat, 2015; Mirning et al., 2017; Wiese, Metta & 
Wykowska, 2017). Providing an artificial agent with human-like behaviors might increase social 
attunement toward it, and this aspect might be crucial for deploying artificial agents in environments 
where social interaction with them is desirable (e.g., robot-assisted training for individuals diagnosed 
with autism; Scassellati, Admondi, Matarić, 2012). In fact, several authors demonstrated the 
advantages of providing artificial agents with human-like behaviors on the quality of interaction with 
humans (Hancock et al., 2011; Thepsoonthorn, Ogawa & Miyake, 2018).  
Perceiving human-likeness from an artificial agent’s behavior appears to be modulated by its 
behavioral capabilities, ranging from the kinematics of the movement (Gielniak, Liu & Thomaz, 
2013) to the agent’s responsiveness to external stimuli (Willemse & Wykowska, 2019). Even during 
the interaction with conspecifics, humans rely partially on motion cues when they need to infer the 
mental states underpinning behavior. Similar processes might be activated during the interaction with 






faithfully reproduce human-like behavior may undermine the interaction, causing a shift in 
attribution: from being endearing to being uncanny (Mori, 1970). Furthermore, it is still not clear 
whether individual biases and prior knowledge related to artificial agents can override perceptual 
evidence of human-like traits (Hinz, Ciardo & Wykowska, 2019). We hypothesize that human 
sensitivity to such characteristics varies depending on individual differences and available contextual 
information. The current study aims to investigate human sensitivity to anthropomorphic 
characteristics of robot’s behavior, based on motion cues, under different conditions of prior 
knowledge. To meet this aim, we manipulated the human-likeness of the behavior displayed by the 
robot and the explicitness of instructions provided to the participants. As a secondary aim, we 
explored some of the individual differences that affect general attitudes towards robots, and the 





Seventy-nine participants took part in the experiment (mean age = 24.0, SD = 4.4, 50 females). All 
participants reported no history of psychiatric or neurological diagnosis, substance abuse, or 
psychiatric medication. Our experimental protocols followed the ethical standards laid down in the 
Declaration of Helsinki and were approved by the local Ethics Committee (Comitato Etico Regione 
Liguria). Each participant provided written informed consent to participate in the experiment. 
Participants were not informed regarding the purpose of the study before the experiment but were 
debriefed upon completion. 
 
2.2.3.2 Stimuli and Apparatus 
 
  In the current study, we sat our participants in a dimly lit sound-attenuated room, in front of an iCub 
robot (Metta et al. 2008; Natale et al. 2017) that was “playing” a solitaire card game on a laptop 
located in front of it. We placed a screen connected to a loudspeaker on the right of the iCub robot, 
on which we played scenes of various movies that were aimed to “distract” the robot from the game. 
Neither of the screens’ displays was visible from the participant’s position, but the sound produced 
by the loudspeaker was audible to everyone in the room (Fig. 1). The setup of the current study was 
the replica of a previous attentional capture experiment, which involved human participants playing 
the same solitaire card game while being distracted by the same sequence of movie scenes (see 








Figure 1. Experimental setup.  
 
Experimental design and procedure. Before the experiment, we asked all participants to complete a 
brief sociodemographic questionnaire along with the Autism Quotient test (AQ, Baron-Cohen, et al., 
2001), the Big Five Inventory (BFI, John & Srivastava, 1999), and the Negative Attitude Towards 
Robots Scale (NARS, Syrdal, et al., 2009). We adopted these questionnaires as they are all freely 
available, easy to administer, and vastly used to broadly assess individual differences that might affect 
human-robot interaction (see, for example, Schweinberger, Pohl & Winkler, 2020; Muller & Richert, 
2018). 
All participants of the present experiment were exposed to two different conditions determined by 
the behavior displayed by the robot: human-like or machine-like. The order of these conditions was 
counterbalanced between participants. Each behavior consisted of an 8-minutes sequence of eye- and 
head-movements.  
In the human-like condition, the robot’s behavior was derived from the recordings of a human 
participant’s eyes and head movement collected using an eye-tracker (Tobii Pro Glasses 2) and an 
inertial sensor (Bosch Sensortec BNO055 Intelligent 9-Axis Absolute Orientation Sensor) during the 
attentional capture experiment mentioned above. Human data recorded in our previous experiment 
were transferred to the iCub head and eyes using a minimum-jerk controlling algorithm. It is 
important to point out that the behavior observed in the recordings of the human participant was 
highly variable: each reaction to a distracting stimulus was different from the others in terms of 
temporal and spatial kinematics (ranging from minimal and fast to wide and slow movements). The 
behavior displayed by the robot in the "human-like" condition was aimed to embody the same 






In contrast, for the machine-like condition, we programmed the robot to display repetitive, 
predictable, and constant behavior. Thus, the machine-like behavior consisted of only one pattern of 
neck and eye movements, based on the average temporal and spatial movement dynamics extracted 
from the human recording of the aforementioned experiment. To maximize the difference between 
the two conditions, during the machine-like behavior, the robot was programmed to move its eyes 
from left to right repetitively while “playing” the solitaire card game and to react to each distracting 
stimulus with exactly the same head turn.  
We asked the first forty participants (mean age = 24.1±3.73; mean education = 15.8±2.3; 24 females) 
to carefully observe the robot’s behavior during both conditions without adding any further 
instruction or information. The remaining thirty-nine participants (mean age =24.3 ± 5.07; mean 
education = 15.2 ± 2.0; 26 females) were told explicitly, from the beginning of the experiment, that 
the robot would display two different behaviors, and that their task would be to identify which one 
was based on a human’s recordings.  
After each condition, all seventy-nine participants filled out the GodSpeed questionnaire (Bartneck 
et al., 2009) to assess the tendency to attribute anthropomorphic, animated, and likable traits to a 
robot, and they took part in the InStance test (Marchesi et al., 2019) to investigate the tendency of 
humans to explain the behavior of a robot using either a mentalistic or a mechanistic vocabulary. 
After the completion of both experimental sessions and the questionnaires, all participants were asked 
if they noticed any difference between the two behaviors displayed by the robot. In case of a positive 
answer, participants were asked to elaborate on their answer, explicating which one of the two 
behaviors they thought was more similar to human behavior and why. We expected that participants 
who noticed the difference between the two conditions would be unanimous on the “correct” 
attribution of human-likeness. However, we received unexpected human-likeness attributions toward 
the machine-like condition that we kept into consideration during the data analysis. Eventually, this 
final explicit question allowed us to differentiate people in terms of sensitivity to the behavioral 
manipulation and terms of correctly attributed/misattributed human-likeness. 
2.2.4 Data Analysis 
 
 To explore the effects of our experimental manipulation, several mixed effect general linear models 
(GLM) were applied in R studio. In each model, we considered the responses in the GodSpeed 
questionnaire and the InStance test as separate dependent variables and each participant's intercept as 






displayed by the robot (HumanLike vs MachineLike) as fixed factors. This family of models allowed 
us to explore the main effects of the single factors and the interaction between the two. 
Additionally, we aimed at exploring the effect of participants’ attribution of human-likeness on the 
InStance and the GodSpeed ratings. Thus, we further grouped our participants based on their 
sensitivity to the subtle differences between the robot’s behaviors and on the explicit attribution of 
human-likeness (provided at the end of the experiment). To avoid confounding effects and/or 
overfitting of the data, we analyzed participants that received explicit instructions separately from 
participants that received no instructions. This decision was made also taking into consideration the 
way participants distributed themselves in the three response groups across the two instructions 
conditions (under no instructions: 14 correctly attributed human-likeness, 9 misattributed human-
likeness, 17 no attribution; under explicit instructions: 31 correctly attributed human-likeness, 8 
misattributed human-likeness, 0 no attribution). This between-group difference was tested using a 
chi-squared test. For all the mixed models, pairwise posthoc comparisons were estimated using the 
Tukey method. Due to the way linear mixed models partition variance, and the lack of consensus on 
the calculation of effect sizes for individual model terms (Rights and Sterba, 2019), we estimated 
standardized effect sizes only in posthoc analyses.  
To investigate individual differences that affect human sensitivity to subtle hints of human-likeness 
in a humanoid robot’s behavior, we calculated Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the AQ, 
BFI, NARS, sociodemographic information, GodSpeed questionnaire, and Instance tests. Since we 
were interested in assessing individual differences that might play a role in the general attitude 
towards robots, for each participant we used the averages of the GodSpeed subscales and InStance 
scores as input variables of the correlation matrix.  
2.2.5 Results 
 
2.2.5.1 Instruction Manipulation and Robot Behavior 
 
Instance ratings. We did not find any significant effects on the InStance scores due to the instructions 
manipulation (F(1, 77)=0.41, p=.522), of the behavior displayed by the robot (F(1, 77)=2.16, p=.146) 
or of the interaction between the two (F(1, 77)=0.57, p=.455) (Fig. 2).  
 
GodSpeed ratings. We found a significant interaction effect on the Anthropomorphism scores 
between instructions manipulation and behavior displayed by the iCub (F(1, 77)=5.64, p=.020), 






manipulation emerged from the data on this subscale (F(1, 77)=0.05, p=.82). Under explicit 
instructions, planned comparisons revealed a significant difference in Anthropomorphism scores: 
participants tended to attribute higher anthropomorphism to the human-like behavior than to the 
machine-like behavior (t(77)=4.01, p<.001). The same pattern was found on the Animacy subscale 
scores, highlighting the interaction between the instructions and the behavior (F(1, 77)= 9.33, 
p=.003), a main effect of the behavior (F(1, 77)= 9.08, p=.004) and a non-significant effect of the 
instructions (F(1, 77)=0.20, p=.654). Planned comparisons pointed out a significant difference in the 
Animacy scores between the human-like and the machine-like behaviors in the group that received 
explicit instructions (t(77)=4.26, p<.001). Interestingly, for the Likeability subscale scores, we found 
a single main effect of the instruction manipulation (F(1, 77)=12.14, p<.001), but neither a significant 
effect of behavior (F(1, 77)=3.50, p=.065) nor of interaction (F(1, 77)=2.03, p=.158). Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed a significant difference between the two instructions provided to the participant 
on the perceived likeability of the robot both after the human-like (t(77)=-2.71, p=.038) and after the 
machine-like (t(77)=-3.93, p<.001) behaviors (see Fig. 2 for details). 
 
2.2.5.2 Robot’s Behavior and Participants’ attribution 
 
The frequencies of participants' human-likeness attribution were different between the two 
instructions we provided them with (𝜒2(2)= 23.47, p<.001). Thus, we ran the subsequent analyses 
separately for the two instruction groups. 
 
No instructions group. No main effect of the robot’s behavior was found on the InStance ratings (F(1, 
37)=0.06, p=.805), nor on the Anthropomorphism (F(1, 37)= 0.35, p=.558), Animacy (F(1, 37)= 0.59, 
p=.448) and Likeability (F(1, 37)=0.23, p=.638) subscales of the GodSpeed.  
Similarly, participant’s human-likeness attribution did not affect neither InStance ratings (F(2, 
37)=1.04, p=.363), nor   Anthropomorphism (F(2, 37)=1.95, p=.157), Animacy (F(2, 37)= 0.52, 
p=.602) or Likeability scores (F(2, 37)=0.42, p=.662).  
No interaction between robot’s behavior and participants’ attribution was found on the InStance (F(2, 
37)=1.76, p=.186) and Anthropomorphism (F(2, 37)=2.21, p=.124). An interaction between behavior 
and attribution was found on Animacy (F(2, 37)=6.16, p=.004) and Likeability (F(2, 37)=7.65, 
p=.002) scores. The effect on the Animacy scores did not survive posthoc comparisons. Post-hoc 
analysis revealed that participants misattributing human-likeness tended to attribute higher likeability 
to the robot displaying the machine-like behavior, compared to the human-like behavior (t(37)=3.77, 






Explicit instructions group. No main effect of the robot’s behavior was found on the InStance ratings 
(F(1, 37)=0.01, p=.940), or on the Anthropomorphism (F(1, 37)=0.51, p=.477), Animacy (F(1, 
37)=0.19, p=.669) and Likeability (F(1, 37)=0.22, p=.639) subscales of the GodSpeed.   
No main effect of participant’s attribution was found on the InStance ratings (F(1, 37)=0.40, p=.529), 
or on the Anthropomorphism (F(1, 37)= 1.45, p= .235), Animacy (F(1, 37)=0.00, p=1.00) and 
Likeability (F(1, 37)=0.45, p=.504) subscales of the GodSpeed. 
A significant interaction between the robot’s behavior and participant’s human-likeness attribution 
was found on the InStance ratings (F(1, 37)=4.31, p=.045), and on the Anthropomorphism (F(1, 37)= 
16.89, p<.001), Animacy (F(1, 37)= 25.40, p<.001) and Likeability (F(1, 37)=4.36, p=.044) scores 
(Fig. 3). The interaction effect on the InStance scores did not survive posthoc comparisons. Planned 
comparisons revealed that participants making the correct human-likeness attribution provided higher 
ratings on Anthropomorphism (t(37)=5.33, p<.001, d=-1.75), Animacy (t(37)=6.04, p<.001, d=-1.98) 
and Likeability (t(37)=2.82, p=.036, d=-0.92) subscales after seeing the human-like behavior. 
Additionally, participants providing the unexpected attribution rated higher than participants 
providing the expected attribution after seeing the machine-like behavior on the Anthropomorphism 
(t(37)=-3.23, p=.010, d=-0.30) and the Animacy (t(37)=-2.97 p =.021, d=-0.72) subscales. 
 
 
Figure 2: Bar charts showing the fixed effect on questionnaire scores due to the interaction between 
the instructions provided to the participants and the behavior displayed by the robot (GLM). Error 









Figure 3: Bar charts showing the fixed effect on the GodSpeed scores due to the interaction 
between the instructions provided to the participants and the behavior displayed by the robot 
(GLM). Error bars: +/- 1. SE. Asterisks denote significant comparisons. Numbers indicate the mean 
value of each cell.  
2.2.5.3 Individual differences  
 
Our analyses showed small negative correlations between the InStance score and years of education 
(r(77)=-.257, p=.022)   and AQ scores (r(77)=-.246, p=.029). We also found small negative 
correlations between the Likeability subscale of the GodSpeed questionnaire and the three subscales 
of the NARS (“Situations of Interaction”: r(77)=-.27, p=.018; “Social Influence”: r(77)=-.23, p=.040; 
“Emotions in Interaction” r(77)=-.29, p=.008). Additionally, our results pointed out a systematic, 
although small, set of correlations between BFI and NARS subscales. Specifically, the 
Conscientiousness subscale of the BFI correlates negatively with the subscales “Situations of 
Interaction” (r(77)=-.32, p=.004) and “Social Influence” (r(77)=-.28, p=.012) of the NARS. Besides, 
the Neuroticism subscale of the BFI correlates positively with the subscales “Situations of 









The main aim of the current study was to assess whether the information available before the 
interaction with an artificial agent modulates human sensitivity to subtle hints of an agent’s human-
likeness. Our data showed that prior knowledge related to the behaviors that we implemented in the 
robot affected the sensitivity to behavioral manipulation. When we provided no a-priori information 
related to the nature of the behaviors implemented in the robot, participants overlooked the details of 
the behaviors. Consequently, nearly half of the sample provided with no instructions was not able to 
recognize any difference between the human-like and the machine-like behaviors. Furthermore, even 
those participants who spotted the differences between the behaviors often misattributed human-
likeness. In addition, we could not find any significant differences in their InStance and GodSpeed 
scores between conditions. In contrast, all the participants who received the explicit instructions 
detected a difference between the two behaviors, and this was reflected in the anthropomorphism, 
animacy, and likeability attributed to the robot. 
When we prompted our participants' attention to notice hints of human-likeness in the behaviors of 
the robot, they tended to differentiate more their answers in the GodSpeed questionnaire between 
conditions, as if their perception of anthropomorphism, animacy, and likeability depended mainly on 
their belief of what a human-like movement should look like. This suggests that subtle evidence of 
behavioral human-likeness might be too weak of a signal during tasks merely involving the 
observation of artificial agents’ behavior. This might be related to the fact that in natural interactions 
with humans, we are usually not monitoring (or not being asked to monitor) the human-likeness of 
the counterpart’s behavior. Thus, human-likeness might be an implicit feature of human behavior, 
which we derive only if needed to explain the behavior of a non-human agent. Therefore, during 
everyday life, our sensitivity to such subtle hints might be low, as we more likely perceive “gestalt” 
relations between behavioral and contextual elements rather than pure and distinct behavioral features 
(Spelke, 1990; Hamlyn, 2017).  
Our results suggest that the concept of human-likeness itself varies across individuals, overriding 
perceptual evidence – our participants tended to confirm their own biases and modulated their 
responses on the GodSpeed questionnaire based on their own perception of human-like behavior, 
rather than the actual human-like behavior of the robot. This casts a shadow on the idea that having 
artificial agents able to behave exactly like human beings would, improve social interaction with 
them, as people appear to have very different priors related to the concept of human-likeness. Indeed, 






behaviors, regardless of its human-likeness. In other words, perceived, but not actual, human-likeness 
influenced the likeability of the robot. Thus, the attractiveness of interacting with a humanoid robot 
might be independent of the subtle behaviors it displays, but might rather depend on the users' 
attitudes toward it. This further suggests that the less an individual knows about the process of 
implementation of behavior in a robot, the more they enjoy the interaction with it and perceives it as 
more engaging. Taken together, these results suggest that the differences in knowledge between 
participants override perceptual evidence and tweak individual sensitivity to behavioral cues. 
The presence of individual differences that affect the way humans interact with artificial agents is 
further supported by the correlation between BFI and NARS subscales. Our results showed that 
certain personality traits, such as neuroticism and conscientiousness, influenced participants’ 
attitudes towards robots. High neuroticism scores are often associated with the tendency to experience 
negative emotions during social interaction (Kaplan et al., 2015). The positive correlation between 
neurotic traits and NARS scores supports previous literature, suggesting that neurotic people might 
experience discomfort during the interaction with artificial agents, similarly to how they feel in 
interactions with other humans (Müller & Richert, 2018). On the other hand, high conscientiousness 
often relates to better self-regulation and emotional stability, which positively affect social interaction 
(Smith, Barstead, Rubin, 2017), and might as well ease the interaction with artificial agents. The 
negative correlation between InStance and AQ scores further supports the idea that social abilities 
affect humans’ general attitude towards artificial agents. Indeed, people with higher autistic traits 
appeared to have difficulties with explaining the behavior of a robot in terms of the underpinning 
mental states, relying more on mechanistic terms rather than on mentalistic vocabulary. This might 
be due to the familiarity that a person has regarding a certain vocabulary when interpreting behaviors 
in general. Besides, we also found a negative correlation between the Instance test score and the 
participants' education. We speculate that participants with a higher level of education might be more 
familiar with the design and functionality of technology in general. This prior knowledge might bias 
them to explain our robot’s behavior relying more on its mechanical apparatus rather than its “desires” 
and “intentions”. We postulate that personality traits and attitudes that play a role in the interaction 
between humans translate into different approaches towards artificial agents as well. This hypothesis 
is further supported by the negative correlation between NARS subscales and the perceived 
Likeability of the robot, indicating that participants’ attitudes towards robots affect their engagement 
during the interaction. Future studies should further explore individual differences that affect 
participants’ behavior and attitudes toward robots to understand whether they play a similar role 






In conclusion, our study suggests that individual knowledge, beliefs, and biases play a major role in 
modulating human perception of an artificial agent’s behavior. These influences seem to be even 
stronger than perceptual evidence during observational scenarios and need to be taken into 
consideration in future studies. 
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Human-robot interaction research could benefit from knowing how various parameters of robotic eye 
movement control affect specific cognitive mechanisms of the user, such as attention or perception. 
In the present study, we systematically teased apart control parameters of Trajectory Time of robot 
eye movements (rTT) between two joint positions and Fixation Duration (rFD) on each of these 
positions of the iCub robot. We showed recordings of these behaviors to participants and asked them 
to rate each video on how human-like the robot’s behavior appeared. Additionally, we recorded 
participants’ eye movements to examine whether the different control parameters evoked different 
effects on cognition and attention. We found that slow but variable robot eye movements yielded 
relatively higher human-likeness ratings. On the other hand, the eye-tracking data suggest that the 
human range of rTT is most engaging and evoked spontaneous involvement in joint attention. The 
pattern observed in subjective ratings was paralleled only by one measure in the implicit objective 
metrics, namely the frequency of spontaneous attentional following. These findings provide 
significant clues for controller design to improve the interaction between humans and artificial agents. 
 
Index Terms— Behavioral sciences, Biological control systems, Robot control, Humanoid robots, 
Eye movements 
2.3.2 Introduction 
The human eyes play a special role in daily interactions with others. With gaze, we efficiently 
communicate to others our internal mental states and our interest in the external environment 
(Kobayashi & Kohshima, 2001; Emery, 2000). Sometimes, just by looking at a person’s, we are able 
to infer the other’s intentions, emotions, or action plans. During interaction with another human, the 
eye region typically is the most attended of all facial features and the most used source of information, 
independent of the specific characteristics of the interaction (Itier and Batty, 2009).  
In order to improve the quality of the interaction, Pelachaud and Bilvi (2003) proposed a 
communicative model of gaze for embodied conversational agents. The authors claimed that simple 
variations in the temporal components of gaze behavior might induce different attributions toward 
the artificial agent. Other authors tested the implementation of gaze behavior in artificial agents 
during different activities, such as storytelling, conversation and reading (for a review, see Ruhland 
et al., 2015) and concluded overall that this implementation requires integration of knowledge from 
a large number of disciplines, from neuroscience to computer graphics. In order to design such 






From a practical point of view, robot designers developed several tools to improve the naturalness of 
their artificial agents’ behaviors. Biologically plausible controllers might facilitate communication 
during human-robot interaction. Indeed, the implementation of human-like behavior in an artificial 
agent might encourage the adoption of the same mental models humans spontaneously adopt towards 
their conspecifics. However, additional studies are needed in order to test this hypothesis and provide 
designers additional guidelines defining the best design of such controllers. In this context, we present 
a systematic approach of exploring not only the reliability of theoretical models but also participants’ 
perception of an artificial agent displaying various types of gaze behaviors. We use objective (eye-
tracking) and subjective measures (ratings) in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of how various 
gaze behaviors are received by the user. 
2.3.2.1 Aims 
 
In this work, we investigate how different configurations of the same robot controller may affect 
cognition and attentional engagement of the user, as well as subjective impression of the robot’s 
human-likeness while maintaining the same task for all the conditions. We aim to provide roboticists 
with novel methods, grounded in cognitive psychology, for developing customizable controllers and 
for using effective strategies to configure the existing ones.  To address the aims of our study, we 
filmed an iCub robot (see Metta et al., 2008; Natale et al., 2017) that was systematically manipulated 
to display two specific parameters of eye movements in the iCub controller: Trajectory Time (rTT) 
and Fixation Duration (rFD). rTT refers to the time required for the robot’s pupil to shift from one 
fixed position to one other fixed position in space. rFD refers to the amount of time that the robot’s 
pupil spends on a given target before moving again.  We administered a rating scale to examine how 
these manipulations affected subjective attributions of human- likeness. Furthermore, to tease apart 
how human cognitive and attentional mechanisms are affected by these manipulations, we tracked 
participants’ eye movements, as eye movement patterns are closely related to attention and cognition 
(Deubel and Schneider, 1996).  We expected variations in rTT and rFD to affect subjective 
attributions of human-likeness as well as characteristic features of attentional engagement and 





Thirty-four participants were recruited for this experiment (mean age = 25; S.D. = 3.9 years; 21 






psychiatric or neurological diagnosis, substance abuse or psychiatric medication. Our experimental 
protocols followed the ethical standards laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki and were approved 
by the local Ethics Committee (Comitato Etico Regione Liguria). Each participant provided written 
informed consent to participate in the experiment. Participants were not informed regarding the 




In the current study, we estimated an average human-like TT by applying the model proposed by 
Baloh et al. (1975), using the following formula: 𝑇𝑇 = 37 𝑚𝑠 + 2.7 ∗ |𝛼|, where α represents the 
visual angle (in degrees) between two targets. For small angles, the calculated trajectory times would 
be beyond the iCub physical constraints, thus we selected a visual angle of 60 degrees between the 
two joint positions. Based on this angle, an average TT of 200 ms was estimated. In the present study, 
we manipulated the velocity profile and the periodic state of TT. While the first refers to the speed of 
the eye movement, the latter refers to the variability displayed during the trial.  
Overall, we considered the implementation of the following behavior in the iCub robot:  
(1) A fixed, behavior, showing no variability, calculated as an “average human behavior”. 
(2) A “human-range variable” behavior based on literature and human’s eye models, showing 
variability.  
(3) A “slow-range variable” behavior, designed to be considerably slower than the human-range 
behavior.  
This design allowed us to define the effect of periodic state manipulation by comparing behavior (1) 
and (2), and the effect of velocity profile by comparing behavior (2) and (3). 
Consequently, we defined three conditions for rTT: a fixed behavior (𝐹𝑇𝑇) during which rTT was 
constant, a human-range variable (𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑇𝑇) behavior and a slow-range variable behavior (𝑆𝑅𝑉𝑇𝑇). 
With regard to rFD, previous studies suggested that for humans, the typical pause time between two 
subsequent eye movements (i.e. fixation duration) is approximately 200 ms (Salthouse and Ellis, 
1980). We decided to refer to this lower bound and to explore the same variability range adopted for 
rTT. Therefore, we adopted the same approach used for rTT, defining three conditions for rFD: a 
fixed behavior (𝐹𝐹𝐷) during which rFD was constant, a human-range (𝐻𝑅𝑉𝐹𝐷) behavior during which 
rFD was variable (Andrews and Coppola, 1999), and a slow-range variable behavior (𝑆𝑅𝑉𝐹𝐷). Then, 










Robot Fixation Duration (rFD) 






200 ms 𝐹𝑟𝑇𝑇 - 𝐹𝑟𝐹𝐷 𝐹𝑟𝑇𝑇 -𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑟𝐹𝐷 
 
𝐹𝑟𝑇𝑇 - 𝑆𝑅𝑉𝑟𝐹𝐷 
 




𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑟𝑇𝑇 - 𝑆𝑅𝑉𝑟𝐹𝐷 
 




𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑟𝑇𝑇 - 𝑆𝑅𝑉𝑟𝐹𝐷 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of the experimental conditions for rTT and rFD. 
 
Based on our experimental conditions, we implemented the nine different behaviors in the iCub robot. 
The behaviors were filmed using a 4K Handycam FDR-AX53 by Sony (Minato, Tokyo, Japan). Each 
video started with the robot looking straight-ahead (2 sec). Then, the eyes started moving from the 
initial position (I) to either position A (right) or B (left). Then, the eyes moved from one position to 
the other, for another ten seconds. Immediately after, the robot eyes returned to the I position. 
Subsequently, the head of the robot turned either to the right or to the left with a 70 degrees amplitude. 
Eventually, the head and the eyes returned to the initial position. The manipulation of occasional head 
movement was introduced in order to test whether participants would engage in a spontaneous 
attentional following (measured by fixations that would land laterally with respect to the face, in the 
same direction as the head movement) and whether their spontaneous attentional following would 
depend on the robot behavior. Importantly, for the measures of the spontaneous attentional following 
would depend on the robot behavior. Importantly, for the measures of the spontaneous attentional 
following, the stimuli remained identical across conditions(i.e., the head movement was always the 
same). Therefore, any differential effects would be due to some sort of “priming” by preceding robot 
behavior (fixed, variable, human-range or slow-range). Each behavior was filmed twice (one starting 
from I to A and one starting from I to B). Consequently, we filmed 18 videos to be used for the 
experiment. 
 
2.3.3.3 The iCub’s gaze controller 
 
In this study, we used the Cartesian 6-DoF gaze controller developed for the iCub robot (Roncone et 






the robot for looking at 3D Cartesian fixation points in space. This controller fits well with our 
requirements since it allows specifying the point-to-point execution time for the neck (TN)  and the 
eyes (TE). 
Therefore, we implemented the robot’s eye movements simply by tuning the TE parameter, 
considering the nine different conditions shown in Table 1.  
We implemented a Python script interfacing with the IGazeController Yarp class (Paul et al., 2014). 
The functions for controlling both the eyes and the neck are shown in Listing 1. In the moveEyes 
method, we controlled the robot to move the eyes between two pre-defined fixation points for a total 
duration of 10 seconds. 
The fixation points are provided in relative angles (azimuth, elevation, and vergence) according to 
the controller’s specifications. Once 10 seconds had elapsed, the moveNeck method was called for 
shifting the gaze in a pre-defined location (to the left or right). In this case, we released the block on 
the neck to let the robot rotate the head along the yaw angles. 
1. def moveEyes(FD_MIN, FD_MAX, TT_MIN, TT_MAX):  
2.     IGazeControl.blockNeckYaw()   
3.     IGazeControl.blockNeckPitch()   
4.     IGazeControl.blockNeckRoll()   
5.     while True:   
6.        fd = random.uniform(FD_MIN, FD_MAX)   
7.        tt = random.uniform(TT_MIN, TT_MAX)   
8.        fp = gaze_positions.next()   
9.        IGazeControl.setEyesTrajTime(tt)     
10.        IGazeControl.lookAtRelAnglesSync(fp)   
11.        time.sleep(fd)   
12.    
13. def moveNeck():   
14.     IGazeControl.blockNeckYaw()   
15.     IGazeControl.lookAtRelAnglesSync(YAW_POS)  
16.     time.sleep(DISTRACTOR_TIME)   
17.     IGazeControl.lookAtAbsAnglesSync(INIT_GP)   
Listing 1: Python functions for controlling the eyes and the neck of the robot in the different 
condition of the task. 
2.3.3.4 Apparatus 
 
The experimental session took place in a dimly-lit room. Stimuli were presented on a 22” LCD screen 
(resolution: 1366 x 768). A chinrest was mounted on the edge of a table, in order to maintain a 
distance of 63 cm between participants’ eyes and the screen for the entire duration of the experiment. 
Consequently, the forward-looking robot’s face subtended 5.5º by 7.1º of visual angle. We used a 






rate of 500 Hz and spatial accuracy of 0.4º to record binocular gaze data. The experiment was 
programmed in and presented with OpenSesame 3.1.8 (Mathot, Schreij and Theeuwes, 2012) using 




We instructed participants to carefully watch the videos and to evaluate, on a 6-point scale how much 
the behavior displayed by the robot was human-like (0=not at all, 5=extremely). Each video was 
repeated six-times across the whole experiment (108 trials in total) in a random order of presentation. 
The experiment consisted of four blocks of 27 trials to allow for self-paced breaks. During each trial, 
log messages were sent to the eye-tracker at the video onset, the onset of the robot head movement, 
and the video offset. For details on the trial structure, see Fig. 1. 
Prior to the task and before starting the second half of the experiment, a 9-point calibration and 4-
point validation thereof were carried out (mean accuracy = 0.89º; S.D. = 0.70). Additionally, 
participants were recalibrated when deemed necessary (e.g. when a participant moved their head from 
the chinrest). 
 
Fig. 1. A planar view of the iCub robot used in this study. The picture depicts the typical trial 
sequence, illustrating the iCub’s behavior (staggered panels) and the subsequent human-likeness 











In order to explore the potential effects of rTT and rFD on participants’ ratings, a mixed model was 
applied in R Studio. We considered participants’ responses as the dependent variable and intercept 
as a random factor. Then, we computed rTT and rFD as fixed factors of the model. This procedure 
allowed us to explore the main effects of the single factors and the effect of interaction between the 
two. Pairwise post hoc comparisons were estimated using the Tukey method.  
For the purpose of investigating whether the eye movements implemented in the iCub controller 
affected participants' eye movements during the videos, analyses on the eye-tracking data were 
performed. Three participants (mean age = 24.67; S.D. = 1.53; 1 female) were excluded from these 
analyses due to technical errors in the eye-tracker recordings. In order to facilitate processing of the 




Fig. 2. A frame of the trial sequence depicting the iCub robot. The figure indicates the Area of 
Interest (AoI)used for the analyses, defined as the red rectangle. 
 
For each participant, we calculated proportional dwell time (the amount of recorded gaze samples 
within the AoI regardless of eye movement type) and total fixation count to investigate where our 
participants attended. We examined the average fixation duration to underpin the temporal 
characteristics of these mechanisms on the AoI per condition between the onset of the video and the 
iCub’s head movement. Finally, we investigated whether a fixation lateral to the face occurred within 






We then processed the landing position -the horizontal vector- of the first lateral fixation in the same 
direction as the head movement.  
Considering the skewed distribution of our data, we computed these metrics as the dependent 
variables of different Mixed Models. Each model’s output provided us with predicted values of all 
the metrics input as dependent variables. Such predicted values derive from raw data and were 
corrected based on the effects taken into account in the Mixed Models. In order to maximize 
comprehensibility and graphical rendering of the effects, we plotted predictive values instead of the 
raw data. Subsequent pairwise post hoc comparisons were estimated using the Tukey method.  
2.3.4 Results 
 
2.3.4.1 Subjective reports 
 
For the human-likeness ratings, we found that the slow-range variable (SRV) condition was evaluated 
as most human-like. We observed a main effect of condition both on rTT (F=7.67, p<0.001, Fig. 3, 
left) and on rFD (F=34.61, p<0.001, Fig. 3, right).  
 
 
Fig. 3. Human-likeness ratings across the study. On the left: robot’s Trajectory Time (rTT) main 
effect on participants’ ratings (F: Mean=2.08, S.D.=1.30; HRV: Mean=2.12., S.D.=1.29; SRV: 
Mean=2.25, S.D.=1.32). On the right: robot’s Fixation Duration (rFD) main effects on participants’ 






Predicted values are plotted on the y-axes in order to facilitate the interpretation of results. Vertical 
bars denote +/- 1 standard error. Horizontal bars denote differences surviving post hoc comparison. 
 
Post hoc comparisons revealed that our participants evaluated the SRV condition significantly more 
human-like than the other two conditions. No significant differences were found between the fixed 
and human-range conditions (see Table 2 for detailed comparisons).  
 
  
Contrast z.ratio p.value 
Fixation Duration 𝐹𝑟𝐹𝐷 vs 𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑟𝐹𝐷 -1.377 0.3528 
𝐹𝑟𝐹𝐷 vs 𝑆𝑅𝑉𝑟𝐹𝐷 -7.803 <0.0001* 
𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑟𝐹𝐷 vs 𝑆𝑅𝑉𝑟𝐹𝐷 -6.419 <0.0001* 
Trajectory Time 𝐹𝑟𝑇𝑇 vs 𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑟𝑇𝑇 -0.614 0.8123 
𝐹𝑟𝑇𝑇 vs 𝑆𝑅𝑉𝑟𝑇𝑇 -3.660 0.0007* 
𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑟𝑇𝑇 vs 𝑆𝑅𝑉𝑟𝑇𝑇 -3.046 0.0066* 
Table 2. Z ratio and p values resulting from the post hoc comparisons for the human-likeness 
ratings; asterisks denote the significant results. 
2.3.4.2 Objective measures: eye-tracking data 
 
The eye-tracking data is visualized in Fig 4. Heat maps suggested the presence of differences in 
fixation patterns due to TT manipulation. 
Our results in the objective implicit eye-tracking measures showed a somewhat different pattern than 







Fig. 4 Fixation heat maps for each rTT condition across the experiment. On the left: trial onset until 
head movement; on the right: head movement until the end of the trial). 
 
 
Human-range variability condition (HRV). Importantly, the eye-tracking data showed that at the 
implicit level of processing, human-range variability (HRV) engaged participants’ attention more 
than the slow-range variability (SRV) – a differential effect on fixation durations, and evoked higher 
degree of spontaneous joint attention than the other two conditions – an effect on the range of lateral 
fixations and speed of attentional following. In more detail, our results showed that participants 
fixated on the eye region longer for the HRV condition, as compared to SRV, as evidenced by the 
significant main effect of rTT for the eye region (F=4.84, p=0.01) in the average fixation duration, 
and significant difference between HRV and SRV, (z=3.03, p=0.01), planned comparison. No 
significant differences were found between F and HRV (z=-2.13, p=0.08) or between SRV and F 
(z=0.93, p=0.63) (Fig. 5. left). Furthermore, participants showed a higher degree of spontaneous 
attentional following in the HRV condition, relative to the other conditions: analyses on lateral 
fixations recorded after the robot head movement revealed a significant main effect of rFD on the 
horizontal vector of the first fixation location (F=4.41, p=0.01). Planned comparisons revealed a 
significant difference between F and HRV condition (t=-2.81, p=0.01). A marginal difference was 
found between HRV and SRV condition (t=2.24, p=0.07), while no differences were found between 








Fig. 5. Fixation patterns across the study. On the left: robot’s Trajectory Time (rTT) main effect on 
participants’ fixation duration (F: Mean=439ms, S.D.=309ms; HRV: Mean=460ms., S.D.=321ms; 
SRV: Mean=428ms, S.D.=275ms). Log-transformed (Ln) predicted values are plotted on the y-axis 
in order to facilitate the interpretation of results. On the right: robot’s Fixation Duration (rFD) main 
effects on the absolute horizontal vector of the first fixation. (F: Mean=2.6°, S.D.=1.8°; HRV: 
Mean=4.2°., S.D.=3.0°; SRV: Mean=3.8°, S.D.=2.4°). Location was estimated as the distance from 
the center of the iCub face. Predicted Blom inverse normal transformed values (INT) are plotted on 
the y-axis in order to facilitate the interpretation of results. Vertical bars denote +/- 1 standard error. 
Horizontal bars denote differences surviving post hoc comparison. 
 
Fixed-behavior condition (F). Interestingly, also the fixed behavior condition elicited distinctive gaze 
patterns, compared to other conditions, which was also – similarly to the HRV condition - not in line 
with the subjective ratings. 
Specifically, we found that participants’ gaze was directed toward the eye region significantly more 
(in terms of dwell times) during the Fixed-behavior condition, than during the other two conditions, 
as evidenced by a main effect of rTT on participants' proportion of dwell times on the eye region of 
the iCub (F=4.01, p=0.02), and the significant differences between SRV (z=2.48, p=0.04) and HRV 
(z=2.43, p=0.04) conditions (Fig. 6, left). Analyses did not reveal any effects of rFD on eye region 
dwell time or of either TT or FD on the dwell time on the whole face. 
Furthermore, a significant main effect of rTT was found on the number of fixations that occurred in 






than in the HRV condition (z=2.96, p=0.01). No significant differences were found between SRV 




Fig. 6. Fixation patterns across the study. On the left: robot’s Trajectory Time (rTT) main effect on 
participants’ proportional dwell time (eye region) (F: Mean=0.82, S.D.=0.27; HRV: Mean=0.80., 
S.D.=0.29; SRV: Mean=0.80, S.D.=0.28). Normalized predicted values of dwell time are plotted on 
the y-axis in order to facilitate the interpretation of results. On the right: robot’s Trajectory Time 
(rTT) main effects on participants’ amount of fixations (F: Mean=20.41, S.D.=9.89; HRV: 
Mean=19.51, S.D.=10.11; SRV: Mean=20.03, S.D.=9.83). Predicted values of fixation count are 
plotted on the y-axis in order to facilitate the interpretation of results. Vertical bars denote +/- 1 
standard error. Horizontal bars denote differences surviving post hoc comparison. 
 
Slow-range variable condition (SRV). The slow-range variable condition elicited a distinctive pattern 
only in the frequency of instances of attentional following, and this is the only result from the implicit 
measures that follow the explicit subjective reports. The generalized linear model revealed a 
significant main effect of rTT on the occurrence of spontaneous gaze following (𝑋2(2)=6.82, 
p=0.03). Specifically, planned comparisons revealed a significant difference between SRV and HRV 
(z=-2.46, p=0.04). No difference were found between F and either HRV (z=0.48, p=0.88) and SRV 








Fig. 7. Spontaneous gaze following of participants during the study. Robot Trajectory Time (rTT) 
main effect on participants’ on the proportion of participants’ occurrence of gaze following 
behavior (F: 35.7% of total F events, HRV: 35.7% of total HRV events, SRV: 39.6% of total SRV 
events). Logit transformed predicted proportion is plotted on the y-axis. Vertical bars denote +/- 1 




 The aim of our study was to examine how various parameters of humanoid eye movements affect 
the subjective impression of human-likeness and attentional engagement, measured with implicit 
objective measures (eye-tracking). We manipulated the behavior of the iCub humanoid to display 
either fixed patterns (fixed trajectory times and fixed fixation durations) or variable trajectory times 
and fixation durations with a human-range variability (HRV) or a slow-range variability (SRV).  
Our results showed that the SRV elicited the highest degree of human-like impression, as reported in 
subjective ratings. Interestingly, when asked to elaborate on their choices, 59% of our sample reported 
that the “slower” behavior showing variability seemed to be more natural than the others were. Some 
of them reported that this specific behavior seemed to be fluid, while the “faster” behavior seemed 
“glitchy”. We speculate that when humans approach a robot, they automatically adopt most available 
strategies to interpret and predict robot behavior (see Marchesi et al., 2019 for a more elaborate 






knowledge3, expectations (all not necessarily realistic) that participants have regarding how a human-
like behavior looks like. 
 Importantly for the purposes of our study, the implicit objective measures showed a different, more 
informative, pattern. The eye-tracking data indicated that HRV attracted more attention and evoked 
more attentional engagement, as evidenced by longer fixation durations on the eye region in this 
condition, compared to the SRV condition. Furthermore, the human-range variability affected joint 
attention, as participants showed a larger degree of following iCub’s directional cues (further location 
of a lateral fixation elicited by the iCub’s head movement), as compared to the other conditions. These 
results show that participants’ implicit (perhaps more automatic) attentional mechanisms became 
(socially) attuned with the robot behavior when it displayed human-range variability and that this 
kind of behavior elicits more attentional engagement.  
On the other hand, the fixed, repetitive, “mechanical” behavior of the robot, although also showed a 
divergent pattern of results than the explicit subjective measures, affected the cognitive mechanisms 
of participants in a different way than the HRV condition. Specifically, it induced a larger number of 
fixations and visits (proportional dwell times), as compared to the other conditions. This might 
indicate that participants “scanned” iCub’s face more (showed a higher number but shorter fixations) 
in the mechanistic condition, perhaps because the brain perceived it as unnatural and unfamiliar 
behavior. This is in line with literature investigating immediateness of biological motion recognition, 
and suggest the existence of low-level processes that we use to discriminate biological and non-
biological motion (Dittrich, 1999). We speculate that humans require a higher amount of fixations to 
scan an agent displaying unnatural behaviors, while fewer fixations are needed when the behavior is 
biologically plausible.  
Finally, the pattern of results observed in the subjective ratings was paralleled by only one implicit 
measure, namely the proportion of instances of attentional following (Fig. 7). This indicates that 
perhaps the general frequency of attentional following was detected at the higher-level of cognitive 
processes, while other, more implicit and subtle cognitive mechanisms were not. This speculation is 
based on the following reasoning: explicit measures pinpoint cognitive processes that are accessible 
to conscious awareness, hence they are higher-level than those that can be captured by implicit 
measures. In our study, participants reported that the SRV condition appeared most human-like. This 
might have been a consequence of detecting that at a lower level of processing, they followed the 
                                                 
3 Our participants’ education, for example, negatively correlated with the ratings, suggesting that the more a person 
might be informed about technology, science or research, the more s/he avoids attributing high human-likeness toward 






head movements of the robot more when it displayed a slower range of eye movements, relative to 
faster ranges. In contrast, the other measures (i.e. fixation duration, predicted fixation location, Fig. 
5) – although clear markers of attentional engagement – were too low-level to reach the conscious 
(and thereby reportable) level of processing.  
An alternative explanation might be that at the higher-level of processing, participants’ responses 
were prone to various biases, such as assumptions regarding what constitutes a “human-like” behavior 
or expectations related to robot behavior. Those biases might have affected conscious reports. As a 
consequence, the frequency of following the head movements of the robot (fig. 7) was influenced by 
those higher-level biases, which would be in line with previous literature on top-down biases in 
attentional following (Ozdem et al., 2017; Wiese et al., 2012; Wykowska et al., 2014). Interestingly, 
the more other mechanisms of attentional engagement (reflected by fixation durations and range of 
following) were not prone to top-down biases, as they were presumably at a much lower-level of 
processing. 
Overall, our results show that explicit subjective reports alone do not provide a comprehensive picture 
of cognitive mechanisms evoked by observation of (or interaction with) a robot. Objective measures 
are necessary to complement subjective reports by addressing specific, and often low-level implicit 
cognitive processes, an argument put forward in previous literature, due to a dissociation that has 
been observed between explicit and implicit measures (Kompatsiari et al., 2018).  
 Related to robot implementations directly, the differences we found in human attentional 
engagement, as well as a subjective impressions evoked by superficially similarly looking conditions 
hint that users' interaction with a robot can be qualitatively affected by subtle differences in its 
behavioral design. This will be investigated further in our future work. Our findings suggest different 
strategies to use for the iCub' gaze controller depending on the type of interaction the scenario requires 
to establish with the user. TE values between 300-500 ms may evoke the impression of more 
'naturalness' in the robot's movements. Faster eye movements may appear less smooth (TE values 
below 300 ms), but if they involve human-range variability (100-300 ms), they should evoke higher 
attentional engagement. In this context, the TE default value (TE = 250 ms) could be reconsidered to 
be increased. Importantly, the variability of TE values among different fixations is a parameter which 
should certainly be considered in robot behavioral design. Our results showed that added variability 
induces a higher impression of human-likeness, and is more attentionally engaging. A human-like 
range of trajectory time elicits most attentional engagement, and attunement in the form of 







In summary, our results confirmed that both implicit and explicit measures need to be taken into 
account when evaluating the user’s reception of a robot behavioral design. Our data show that at the 
level of conscious subjective impressions, the variability of behavior (trajectory times in the case of 
our experiment) create the most human-like impression. Fixed-time mechanistic trajectories do not 
only appear as least human-like, but they also induce fragmented, scattered and short “glimpses”, 
which might have a distracting effect on the user and impair smoothness of interaction. Finally, 
variable robot behavior with human-range of trajectory times attracts attentional focus most, and 
thereby is most engaging, even though this might not reflect in subjective conscious impressions. 
 Throughout the present study, we proposed an approach that uses research methods from 
cognitive psychology to test engineering parameters. Combining such approaches is beneficial for 
the future of both disciplines, by facilitating the interaction between humans and artificial agents and 
by improving our knowledge about ourselves.  
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2.4 Publication IV: Mind the eyes:  artificial agents’ eye movements 
modulate attentional engagement and anthropomorphic attribution 
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2.4.1 Abstract 
 
Artificial agents are on their way to interact with us daily. Thus, the design of embodied artificial 
agents that can easily cooperate with humans is crucial for their deployment in social scenarios. 
Endowing artificial agents with human-like behavior may boost individuals' engagement during the 
interaction. We tested this hypothesis in two screen-based experiments. In the first one, we compared 
attentional engagement displayed by participants while they observed the same set of behaviors 
displayed by an avatar of a humanoid robot and a human. In the second experiment, we assessed the 
individuals' tendency to attribute anthropomorphic traits towards the same agents displaying the same 
behaviors. The results of both experiments suggest that individuals need less effort to process and 
interpret an artificial agent's behavior when it closely resembles one of a human being. Our results 
support the idea that including subtle hints of human-likeness in artificial agents' behaviors would 
ease the communication between them and the human counterpart during interactive scenarios. 
    
Keywords: Humanoid robot, Attentional engagement, Intentional Stance, Mindreading, Eye 
movements 
2.4.2 General Introduction 
 
"Deep", "sparkling", "expressive", "curious", "sad": these are only a few of the adjectives that we can 
use to describe someone's eyes. Some writers even referred to this sense as the window to the soul, 
as it can provide information related to others’ mental states, emotions, and intentions (Vaidya, Jin & 
Fellows, 2014). Indeed, every one of us has experienced the feeling to resonate with someone else 
just at first glance, by making eye contact. If we think about our everyday life, for example, it may 
happen that we meet a stranger and we immediately understand whether he is sad or happy, just by 






the information conveyed by the eyes and are relatively proficient in inferring other agents' mental 
states using such a limited source of information (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). For example, When 
engaged in a joint action with another person, like moving a heavy object, people are spontaneously 
inclined to monitor the partner’s eyes to infer his/her mental states (Huang et al., 2015).  
The relevance of the ability to “read” mental states through the eyes has been widely studied in the 
literature. A number of studies demonstrated that understanding another agent’s gaze direction and 
pattern could be crucial to accomplish a joint task. For example, gaze can cue attention towards an 
intended object (Sebanz, Bekkering & Knoblich), it can signal interests in an event happening in the 
environment (Meyer, Sleiderink & Levelt, 1998), and even anticipate motor actions (Johansson et al., 
2001). Indeed the ability to understand such cues is fundamental in social environments (Butterworth, 
1991).  
Thousands of years of interaction contributed to the development of this ability (Hauser, 1996; Scott-
Phillips, 2010), to the point that people appear to notice gaze cues even when the agent that is 
displaying them is artificial (Fiore et al., 2013). This may be due to the spontaneous adoption of 
cognitive strategies that are similar to those involved in interpreting human-like behaviors displayed 
by non-human agents (Chaminade et al., 2012). Previous research showed, for example, that 
biologically plausible eye-movements displayed by an artificial agent engage an individual's attention 
more than mechanistic movements (Ghiglino et al., 2020a).   
We speculate that endowing subtle hints of human-likeness in the behaviors displayed by an artificial 
agent would promote the implicit association between that agent’s behavior and the behaviors 
individuals experience during every-day interactions (Banks, 2019). Indeed, even the tendency to 
attribute a mind towards an artificial agent appears to increase linearly with its perceived human-
likeness (Krach et al., 2008).  Therefore, equipping artificial agents with a behavioral repertoire that 
is typical of human beings may create the impression that the behavior they display is motivated by 
mental states and intentions and, consequently, facilitate social attunement  (Wiese, Metta & 
Wykowska, 2017). As a cascade effect, this impression would facilitate the understanding of the 
behaviors that the artificial agent displays and would increase the chance of attributing 
anthropomorphic traits to the agent. Understanding how these spontaneous associations work would 
provide useful insights for artificial agents’ developers, and smoothen the inclusion of artificial agents 
in contexts where the interaction between technology and human is required (Dautenhahn, 2007). 
To investigate this role of human-like eye-movements, we designed two screen-based experiments. 
Specifically, we explored attentional engagement towards a humanoid and towards a human avatar 






attentional focus, decision times) displayed by individuals while observing the behaviors of the two 
agents. In the second experiment, we explored individuals’ explicit attribution of anthropomorphism 
towards the robot and the human displaying the same behavior (self-report scales). Finally, we 
compared the results of both experiments, to understand whether subtle hints of human-likeness affect 
only implicit processing as well as explicit attribution of anthropomorphic traits.  
2.4.3 Experiment 1 
 
Our first experiment investigated whether the appearance of the agent (natural vs artificial), the 
behavior displayed by the agent (seemingly intentional vs mechanistic), and the context in which the 
agent is acting (congruent or incongruent with the behavior)  modulate spontaneous attentional 
engagement, during the observation of other agents involved in a task. As a secondary aim, we 
explored whether these factors affected the ability to recognize an agent’s behavior during a decision-




Participants. Fifty-three participants were recruited for this experiment (mean age = 25.2 years SD = 
5.0, 37 females). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of 
psychiatric or neurological diagnosis, substance abuse, or psychiatric medication. Our experimental 
protocols followed the ethical standards laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki and were approved 
by the local Ethics Committee (Comitato Etico Regione Liguria). All participants provided written 
informed consent to participate in the experiment.  
Due to a technical problem with the eye-tracker, we excluded twenty-one participants from data 
analyses (more than 30% of their data were corrupted). Excluded subjects were all individuals with 
corrected-to-normal vision wearing glasses or corrective lenses. Despite passing the calibration 
procedure successfully, a large portion of their eye-tracking data was not recorded. Therefore, our 
final sample consisted of thirty-two participants (mean age = 24.5 years ± 3.63, 22 females). 
 
Stimuli. To address the aims of our first experiment, we filmed the face of a human actor while he 
was either actively Reading a text on a monitor located in front of him (“intentional”, highly variable 
behavior in terms of temporal and spatial dynamics) or passively following a dot that was moving 
across the same monitor (“mechanistic”, repetitive behavior). This latter behavior closely resembled 






the screen in several locations. While the actor was filmed, we recorded his eye-movements using a 
Tobii Pro Spectrum eye-tracker (TobiiAB Stockholm, 2015). The eye-tracker recorded the cartesian 
coordinates of the gaze point relative to the screen during both actions, at a sampling rate of 600 Hz. 
We implemented the eye movement kinematics recorded from the human in a humanoid agent, the 
iCub robot (Metta et al., 2010), which was filmed while emulating the human’s behavior. Then, based 
on the recordings of the human and the iCub, for each agent, we generated two videos where the 
agents were “Reading a text” and two videos where they were “Calibrating”. The duration of each 
video was fourteen seconds. The videos of the robot were coupled with the videos of the human so 




Figure 1 – Examples of videos used in the experiment 
 
Procedure and Apparatus. Before starting the experiment, we informed participants about the content 
of the videos we generated, showing example videos of both agents displaying the “Reading” and the 
“Calibrating” behaviors. During this familiarization phase, we informed them that the two displayed 
behaviors corresponded either to the “Reading” or to the “Calibrating”. 
During the experiment, videos were presented on a 23.8′′ LCD screen (resolution: 1920 × 1080). 
Participants’ head position was limited by a chinrest that was mounted at the edge of the table, at a 
horizontal distance of 60 cm from the screen. We recorded the participants’ binocular gaze data with 
a screen-mounted Tobii Pro Spectrum eye-tracker with a sampling rate of 600 Hz. The illumination 
of the room was kept constant throughout the experimental sessions. Videos and questions were 






We instructed participants to carefully watch the videos to detect, as quickly as possible, whether the 
behavior displayed by the agent was either “Reading” or “Calibrating". Participants provided their 
responses by pressing the buttons of a keyboard corresponding to the letters M and Z, counterbalanced 
across the blocks. After providing their response, participants were asked to rate the confidence in 
their decision. When this last rating was provided, or in case of a timeout, a new trial started, with a 
fixation cross presented for five seconds. 
Participants’ decision times (DTs), the accuracy of the detections, and confidence ratings were saved 
along with the eye-tracker data (fixation duration and fixation count). 
 
Analyses. To explore the effects of Agent, Behavior, and Context on the participants’ attentional 
engagement during the task, we adopted various mixed models on our eye-tracking data, using R 
Studio (RStudio Team, 2015). We defined three main areas of interest (AOI) a priori: (1) the area 
corresponding to the eye region of the agents; (2) the area corresponding to the face region of the 
agents (excluding the eyes); and (3) the area corresponding to the background behind the agents 
(excluding the face). 79.07% of total fixations were recorded within the first AOI (eye region), 5.84% 
within the second (face region), and 15.09% within the third (background region). Considering the 
insufficient amount of data points in the non-eye AOIs, we focused our analyses mainly on the eye 
region. We excluded trials in which the participants provided the incorrect attribution (less than 1% 
of the total trials) from the analysis. 
Fixation duration was the dependent variable of a linear mixed model. Agent, behavior, and context 
were treated as fixed factors and the subjects’ intercept as a random factor. Then, we converted each 
participants’ fixation count relative to each AOI into fixation proportions (i.e. the ratio of fixations 
directed towards each AOI compared to the total number of fixations). Considering the negatively 
skewed distribution of fixation proportion on the eye-region, data were arcsine transformed before 
the analyses. Then, the arcsine transformed fixation proportion on the eye region was included as the 
dependent variable of another mixed model, where agent, behavior, and context were treated as fixed 
factors and the subjects' intercept as a random factor. 
Finally, we analyzed participants’ DTs with an additional linear model. We adopted a minimal a 
priori data trimming (Harald Baayen, R., & Milin, 2010). Given the positively skewed distribution of 
DTs, we applied a logarithmic transformation to the data. Then, log-transformed DTs was included 
as the dependent variable of a final mixed model, where agent, behavior, and context were treated as 






To compensate for the lack of consensus on the calculation of standardized effect sizes for individual 
model terms (Rights & Sterba, 2019), for each model we calculated parameters estimated (β) and 
their associated t-tests (t, p-value) using the Satterthwaite approximation method for degrees of 
freedom. Furthermore, for each parameter estimated we reported the corresponding bootstrapped 
95% confidence intervals. We reported mean values of each dependent variable divided by conditions 
in the Supplementary Materials to ease the reading of the results. To avoid redundancy, in the main 
text we reported only statistics relative to significant results. Non-significant results can be found in 




Fixation duration. To assess the effect of the Agent, its Behavior and the surrounding Context on 
attentional processing, we first analyzed the inter-trial differences in fixation duration. No interaction 
effects were found between Agent, Behavior and Context on fixation duration (all p-values > .05). 
We found a main effect of the Agent [β = -11.80, t(340)= -11.80, p = .028, 95% CI = (-22.14, -1.45); 
Figure 2A] and a Main effect of the Context [β = 19.01, t(340)= 3.52, p < .001, 95% CI = (8.57, 
29.45); Figure 2B]. Planned comparisons revealed that longer fixations occurred when the Agent was 
Human compared with the Robot (t(340) = 4.73, p < .001), and when the Context was Non-
Informative compared with both Congruent and Incongruent contexts(Congruent vs Non-









Figure 2 – Raincloud plots showing the fixed effect on Fixation Duration due to the main effects 
of Agent (A), and Context (B) (GLM). Boxplots associated with the raincloud plots depict median 
values (black horizontal lines), interquartile ranges (black boxes), and upper-lower quartile intervals 
(black whiskers). 
Fixation proportion. We also analyzed the effects of the Agent, its Behavior and the Context on 
fixation proportion. Here, our analysis indicated a significant three-way interaction between Agent, 
Behavior and Context [β = -0.08, t(341) = -2.01, p = .045, 95% CI = (-0.16, -0.01); Figure 3A] and a 
significant two-way interaction between Agent and Behavior [β = 0.10, t(341) = 3.65, p < .001, 95% 
CI = (0.05, 0.16); Figure 3B]. Planned comparisons showed that participants tended to fixate more 
often on the eye region of the human during the Calibrating behavior rather than during the Reading 
behavior, when the context was congruent (t(341) = 5.85, p < .001). A similar difference between the 






when the context was congruent, participants tended to fixate more often on the robot than on the 
human when these agents were displaying the Reading behavior (t(341) = 5.42, p < .001). Likewise, 
we found a difference between the agents when the context was incongruent (t(341) = -3.58, p = 
.020). These results were confirmed by planned comparisons performed on the two-way interaction, 
highlighting that the behavior that required fewer fixations was the human’s Reading compared to 
the human’s Calibrating (t(341) = -7.86, p < .001) and to the robot’s Reading (t(341) = -7.01, p < 
.001). Overall, the Reading behavior required a lower amount of fixations than the Calibrating 
behavior, as highlighted by the main effect of the Behavior [β = -0.12, t(341)  = -5.85, p < .001, 95% 
CI = (-0.16, -0.08)] and subsequent planned comparisons (t(340) = -7.30, p < .001). The interaction 
was paralleled by a main effect of the Agent [β = -0.18, t(32, 341) = -6.32, p < .001, 95% CI = (-0.24, 
-0.13)], indicating that participants were faster to identify the behavior when displayed by the robot 
(t(341) = 7.87, p < .001). Finally, we found a main effect of the Behavior too [β = -0.22, t(32, 341) = 
-7.71, p < .001, 95% CI = (-0.28, -0.17)], indicating that the Reading behavior was faster to identify 









Figure 3 – Histograms and raincloud plots showing respectively the thee-way interaction 
between Agent, Behavior, and Context (A) and the two-way interaction between Agent and 
Behavior (B) (GLM). Vertical bars of the histograms denote +/- 1 standard error, dots denote mean 
values, horizontal bars denote differences surviving post hoc comparison. Asterisks define the level 
of significance of the comparison (*p<.05, **p<.01, p<.001). Boxplots associated with the 
raincloud plots depict median values (black horizontal lines), interquartile ranges (black boxes), and 
upper-lower quartile intervals (black whiskers).  
 
Decision times. To investigate the effect of Agent, Behavior, and Context on the ability to recognize 
behaviors during the task, we also analyzed our participants’ decision times. The analysis pointed out 
a two-way interaction between the Agent and the Behavior [β = 0.17, t(341) = 4.25, p < .001, 95% 
CI = (0.09, 0.25); Figure 4]. Planned comparisons revealed that the behavior that took longer to 
identify was the Calibrating behavior displayed by the human when compared to the robot Calibrating 






Calibrating behavior displayed by the robot took longer to be identified than the Reading behavior 




Figure 4 - Histograms and raincloud plots showing the two-way interaction between Agent and 
Behavior (GLM). Boxplots associated with the raincloud plots depict median values (black 
horizontal lines), interquartile ranges (black boxes), and upper-lower quartile intervals (black 
whiskers). 
 
The interaction was paralleled by a main effect of the Agent [β = -0.18, t(32, 341) = -6.32, p < .001, 
95% CI = (-0.24, -0.13)], indicating that participants were faster to identify the behavior when 
displayed by the robot (t(341) = 7.87, p < .001). Also a main effect of the Behavior was observed [β = 
-0.22, t(32, 341) = -7.71, p < .001, 95% CI = (-0.28, -0.17)], indicating that the Reading behavior was 




With this experiment, we investigated attentional engagement during a novel task that required the 
observation of a human and a robot displaying the same set of behaviors. The results indicated that 
participants displayed longer fixations towards the eye region of the human compared with the same 
region of the robot. Fixation duration is often used as an implicit measure of attentional engagement 
(Ghiglino et al., 2020a; Nummenmaa, Hyönä & Calvo, 2006). Longer fixations are thought to indicate 






individuals’ spontaneous attention more than an artificial agent, due to the natural acquaintance 
people have with their conspecifics (Byrne, 1991).  
The interactions we found on fixation proportion are in line with this hypothesis. Indeed, 
participants explored the area surrounding the eyes mainly when the agent was the human, and when 
he was displaying the Reading behavior. Conversely, individuals explored the face and the 
background regions less when the agent was the robot relative to the human, and when the behavior 
was  Calibrating compared with Reading. This suggests that, during the task, participants' attentional 
resources were focused almost solely on the eye movements of the agent when the agent was artificial, 
and when the behavior was “mechanistic”. The ratio of on-target versus all-targets fixations (i.e. the 
proportion of fixations on a specific area) is often associated with the processing of critical visual 
information (Holmqvist et al., 2011). We, therefore, conclude that participants required less 
attentional efforts to interpret the behavior that they were able to relate to the most (i.e. the Reading), 
especially when the human face, to whom we are more accustomed, displayed it. Indeed, 
understanding intentional behaviors should be easier than attempting to identify mechanistic ones 
(Mele & William, 1992).  
This is in line with the results we found on participants’ decision times. Specifically, we found that 
Reading behavior was relatively fast to identify, while the Calibrating behavior required more time 
to be recognized. Importantly for the aim of the study, the condition that costs the longest decision 
time corresponded to the stimuli where the human was displaying the Calibrating behavior as if 
observing an “intentional” agent that displays a mechanistic behavior requires higher processing 
effort. Interestingly, participants were faster in recognizing both behaviors when the robot displayed 
them than when the human was. This peculiar effect can be explained by taking into account the 
expectations that individuals might have towards the two agents. From a purely anecdotal point of 
view, during the debriefing, a small group of participants reported that they were surprised seeing the 
human behaving “like a robot” (i.e. during the Calibrating behavior). We claim that humans approach 
artificial agents and their conspecifics with different attitudes that could modulate the way they 
interpret behaviors (Hinz, Ciardo, Wykowska, 2019). Based on our results, we can also speculate that 
participants were expecting the robot to display a variety of behaviors (i.e. to behave like a human), 
but they were not expecting the human to behave in a repetitive, mechanistic way (i.e. to behave like 
a robot).  
Along with the effects of Agent and Behavior, we also found the effect of Context on attentional 
processing. In particular, when the Context was non-informative, participants’ fixations on the eye 






behaviors when they were not distracted by the semantic content of the context (i.e. when the context 
was congruent and incongruent). This is in line with past research investigating the relation between 
local con global features of visual information (De Cesarei & Loftus, 2011). Indeed, the presence of 
a "realistic" context might have distracted our participants from the behavior and the agent, attracting 
their attention towards the background. Thus, the cognitive cost associated with the processing of 
Congruent and Incongruent backgrounds could explain the presence of shorter fixation on the eye 
region of both agents. The three-way interaction we found on fixation proportions is in line with this 
hypothesis; indicating that the interaction between the Agent and the Behavior is particularly strong 
when the Context is congruent with the Behavior. Thus, we can claim that context could prime the 
attention towards local cues.  
Taken together, these findings highlight the complex interplay between visual information and 
attentional engagement, suggesting that intentional agents and seemingly intentional behaviors 
spontaneously attract individuals' attention. However, it might also be the case that the effects we 
discussed could be biased by familiarity. Perhaps both the Human-agent and the Reading behavior 
were simply more familiar to the participants than the Robot who was Calibrating, respectively. 
Indeed, we had to provide examples of the Calibrating behavior to participants before the experiment, 
as it is not common behavior for a human being. In a natural environment, this kind of behavior is 
displayed only during medical visits (eye-exam). On the contrary, Reading is an action commonly 
used in everyday life, and this might have facilitated individuals in the early detection of such 
behavior. Therefore, the results we found with Experiment 1 might have been biased due to the 
disparity of the behaviors we selected in terms of prior exposure.  
Therefore, after Experiment 1, we needed to clarify whether the effects we found could be 
explained with reference to the familiarity participants had with the two behaviors, rather than with 
reference to the degree of intentionality displayed in the behaviors. For this reason, we designed a 
second experiment, in which we focused more on the self-report impressions that the second group 
of participants had towards the behaviors used in Experiment 1. Thus, we tested the familiarity of the 
participants with the behaviors along with their attribution of anthropomorphic traits towards the 
human and the robot. 
2.4.4 Experiment 2 
 
Our second experiment investigated how individuals explicitly interpret the behaviors displayed by 
two different agents, namely the iCub robot and a human. We exposed our participants to several 






asked them to infer what the agent was doing. We explored our participants’ spontaneous attributions 
as well as their tendency to attribute anthropomorphic traits towards the two agents. This allowed us 




Participants. Fifty participants took part in this experiment and were tested via Prolific (Prolific, 
2015), an online recruiting platform (mean age = 26.1 ± 6.0, 20 females). All participants reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of psychiatric or neurological diagnosis, 
substance abuse, or psychiatric medication. All participants declared that their first language was 
English. Each participant provided a simplified informed consent (adapted for online studies) before 
the beginning of the experiment. Our experimental protocols followed the ethical standards laid down 
in the Declaration of Helsinki and were approved by the local Ethics Committee (Comitato Etico 
Regione Liguria). 
 
Stimuli and Apparatus. To address the aim of our second experiment, we used the same pool of 
stimuli used in Experiment 1, with a few modifications. Since here we were interested exclusively in 
the interpretation of the behavior as a function of the agent displaying it, we removed the background 
information from the videos (i.e. we used the original green-screen background). We also included a 
third behavior that we filmed at the same time as the Calibrating and the Reading behaviors, which 
corresponded to the agents Watching movies. We excluded this behavior from Experiment 1, as we 
wanted to have a clear distinction between the active, more “mentalistic” behavior (i.e. Reading) and 
the passive, more “mechanistic” behavior (i.e. Calibrating). Human eye-movement while watching 
movies is a visually-guided behavior, but it is not purely stimulus-driven and might constitute a fuzzy 
category between “intentional” and “non-intentional” behaviors (Peters & Itti, 2007). Furthermore, 
in Experiment 2 we also wanted to clarify whether the differences between the Calibrating and 
Reading (found in Experiment 1) were due to the familiarity with the behaviors (i.e. Calibrating being 
unfamiliar to most of the participants) or to the proprieties of the behavior (i.e. mentalistic vs 
mechanistic). Thus, by adding Watching, we included an additional behavior that was qualitatively 
different from the Reading yet with similar familiarity. Consequently, we generated a pool of 12 
videos fitting a 2 (agent; human, robot) x 3 (Behavior; Reading, Calibrating, Watching) design.  
 
Procedure. We ran the experiment online, using Prolific to recruit participants and SoSci Survey 






carefully watch the videos depicting the human and the iCub robot engaged in multiple activities on 
a computer screen. Before the beginning of the experiment, we asked participants to think about all 
the activities that a person can do with a computer (i.e. playing videogames, browsing, taking part in 
a meeting, etc.) and that their task would be to infer what the agents depicted in the videos were doing 
when we filmed them. Participants were allowed to type their answers without a word limit. After 
providing their attributions, participants were asked to report whether the behavior displayed by the 
agent looked familiar to them (two-alternative forced-choice: yes/no), and to rate, on a 10-point Likert 
scale, how much the agent was aware, focused, and interested, as well as the naturalness of the 
displayed behavior. 
 
Analyses. We extracted the verbs used by the participants to describe the actions depicted in the 
videos.  Then, we converted each verb into its non-personal form (gerund). Thus, for each video, we 
excerpted fifty verbs describing the behavior enacted by the agent, according to participants’ answers. 
We then performed a text mining analysis on the verbs to determine the frequency of their use across 
the entire experiment. Then, we compared the frequencies of the most common verbs across 
conditions, using a series of generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) in R Studio. Agent and 
Behavior were treated as fixed factors of the model, and the subjects’ intercept was treated as a 
random factor. Given the nature of our dependent variable (frequency of use), Poisson’s frequency 
distribution was used as a reference function for the models. 
Separately, we analyzed the familiarity reported by participants with each video. We used a GLMM 
to compare conditions. Agent and Behavior were treated as fixed factors and the subjects' intercept 
was treated as a random factor. Since the dependent variable was binary (familiarity), we used the 
binomial distribution as the reference function of the model.   
Finally, we analyzed participants’ ratings on their perceived naturalness of the behavior as well as 
their ratings on perceived awareness, focus, and interest displayed by the agent. Considering the 
negatively skewed distribution of ratings, data were arcsine transformed before the analyses. Then, 
we applied a series of linear mixed models (GLM) to investigate the effects of the Agent and 
Behavior, treated as fixed factors, on the ratings, given the subjects’ intercept as a random factor. 
To clarify whether the effects found on the ratings could be better explained by participants’ 
familiarity with the behaviors, rather than by our experimental design, we estimated four final 
alternative linear models that comprised familiarity as the only fixed factor and each rating as a 
dependent variable. Then, we evaluated the adequacy of each model fit based on a Chi-square 









The ten most used verbs to describe the agents’ behaviors were: reading (count = 207), looking (count 
= 94), watching (count = 86), playing (count = 36), browsing (count = 25), following (count = 24), 
staring (count = 17), moving (count = 13), meeting (count = 12), working (count = 12) (Figure 5). 
Only the first three verbs led to converging models, therefore we excluded all the other verbs from 




Figure 5 – Frequency plot of the ten most used verbs used by participants to describe the agents’ 
behaviors. 
 
Regarding the frequency of use of the verb “reading”, we found a significant main effect of the 
Behavior [β = 2.69, t(293) = 6.37, p < .001, 95% CI = (1.86, 3.51)], indicating that this verb was used 
significantly more to describe the Reading behavior rather than for the Calibrating (z(297) = 8.97, p 
< .001) and Watching (z(297) = 9.09, p < .001) behaviors. We found a complementary main effect 
of the Behavior on the frequency of use of the verb “looking” [β = -1.99, t(293) = -3.24, p = .001, 
95% CI = (-3.20, -0.79)], indicating that this latter verb was used less frequently to describe the 
Reading behavior than to describe the Calibrating (z(297) = -4.48, p < .001) or the Watching (z(297) 
= -3.84, p < .001) behaviors. We also found a trend of the Behavior on the frequency of use of the 
verb “watching” [β = 0.58, t(293) = 1.74, p = .082, 95% CI = (-0.07, 1.23)] that did not reach 






than for the Reading behavior (z(297) = 4.33, p < .001). In addition, participants used the verb 
“watching” slightly more often after the Watching behavior than after the Calibrating one (z(297) = 
2.16, p = .078), and more often after the Calibrating behavior than after the Reading behavior (z(297) 
= 2.63, p = .023). 
When we analyzed the evaluation of familiarity attributed to the videos, we observed a main effect 
of both the Agent [β = -1.70, t(293) = -3.23, p = .001, 95% CI = (-2.72, -0.67); Figure 6A] and the 
Behavior [β = 2.74, t(293) = 3.15, p = .002, 95% CI = (1.04, 4.45); Figure 6B]. The main effect of 
the Agent indicated that videos depicting the human agent were rated as more familiar than videos 
depicting the iCub (z(297) = 3.94, p < .001). The main effect of the Behavior indicated that the 
Reading behavior was perceived as more familiar than both the Calibrating (z(297) = 4.82, p < .001) 
and Watching (z(297) = 6.10, p < .001) behaviors. Surprisingly, the Calibrating behavior was 








Figure 6 – Histograms representing participants’ familiarity with the Agent (a) and with the 
Behavior (b). Horizontal bars denote differences surviving post hoc comparison, asterisks define the 
level of significance of the comparison (*p<.05, **p<.01, p<.001). 
 
Our analyses on participants’ ratings of anthropomorphic traits pointed out a systematic main effect 
of the Agent on all the attributes (i.e. “Naturalness”, “Awareness”, “Focus”, “Interest”). Specifically, 
the human always received higher ratings than the iCub (see Supplementary Materials for detailed 
comparisons). Furthermore, we found a systematic main effect of the Behavior, indicating that the 
Reading behavior received higher ratings than both the Calibrating and the Watching behaviors (see 
Supplementary Materials for detailed comparisons). There was no interaction effect between Agent 
and Behavior.  
Finally, we compared whether the effects on participants’ ratings could be better explained by their 
Familiarity with the behaviors, rather than by the intrinsic characteristics of the Agent and the 
Behavior. For all comparisons, the most predictive models were the ones including the Agent and the 
Behavior as fixed factors, instead of the Familiarity (see Table 1 for detailed comparisons). 
 
Table 1 - Detailed Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) of models for each comparison 
 
Measure Fixed Factor(s) AIC χ2 p 
Naturalness Familiarity -1040 
 
Agent*Behavior -1085.5 53.52 < 
.001 
Awareness Familiarity -1056.4 
 
Agent*Behavior -1107.3 58.95 < 
.001 
Focus Familiarity -1108.2 
 
Agent*Behavior -1114 13.86 0.008 
Interest Familiarity -959.93 
 





With our second experiment, we tested individuals' familiarity with the behaviors and agents used in 
Experiment 1.  When asked to infer the Agents’ actions, participants were highly accurate in 
identifying the Reading behavior, which we designed to be the “intentional” behavior of our stimuli. 
Indeed, the eye-movements recorded during the Watching and the Calibrating behaviors were 






(Troscianko & Hinde, 2011). On the other hand, the eye-movements performed during the Reading 
behavior were actively controlled by the agent himself, who was indeed displaying a top-down 
modulated action (Radach, Huestegge & Reilly, 2008). Observing an “intentional” behavior (i.e. the 
Reading behavior in our experiment) may elicit social cognitive mechanisms related to mindreading, 
which would, consequently, facilitate its identification. This facilitation may sound trivial when 
applied to a natural human-human interaction, as we usually assume human behavior to be driven by 
underpinning mental states and intentions (Dennett, 1971). However, it may be less intuitive when 
applied to artificial agents, as the same facilitation may not apply during observation of robot 
behavior. Indeed, robots do not possess a proper mind to read, but eliciting the ascription of a mind 
towards them could foster human-robot interaction, potentially smoothing the communication 
between natural and artificial systems (Wiese, Metta & Wykowska, 2017). Indeed, our result suggests 
that for our participants it was easier to identify the correct behavior when the action displayed was 
seemingly intentional. We claim that embedding intentional behaviors into embodied, artificial agents 
could boost social engagement by smoothing communication.   
In line with this hypothesis, participants rated the Reading behavior as more natural than the other 
behaviors. Furthermore, when either the human or the robot was displaying it, participants tended to 
rate the agent as more focused, interested, and aware. This suggests that behavioral cues of 
intentionality may affect individuals’ tendency to attribute anthropomorphic traits towards an 
artificial agent.  
It is important to point out that participants perceived the Reading behavior as the most familiar of 
the set, regardless of the agent that was displaying it. Additionally, the nature of the Agent affected 
the attribution of naturalness towards the Behavior, along with the perceived focus, interest, and 
awareness of the Agent (i.e. participants reported high familiarity with the videos that were depicting 
the human agent). However, the model comparisons revealed that the nature of the Agent and the 
Behavior explain our data better than the familiarity ratings alone. This supports the idea that 
familiarity alone cannot fully explain the differences we found in participants’ attributions. At the 
same time, we recognize that intentionality alone might not be the only factor affecting individuals’ 
attribution of anthropomorphic traits towards natural and artificial agents.  
 
2.4.5 General Conclusions 
 
In the current study, we presented two experiments aimed at investigating how individuals perceive 






“intentionality” displayed by their behaviors. Taken together, the results of both experiments suggest 
that observing a human and a humanoid displaying the same set of behaviors evokes different implicit 
attentional processes and, consequently, different explicit attributions.  
Our first experiment highlighted the differences in spontaneous attentional engagement during the 
visual processing of the behavior displayed by the two agents. Processing behaviors that appeared as 
“intentional” (i.e. controlled by the agent itself) required less attentional effort than the “mechanistic” 
ones (i.e. purely stimulus-driven). Based on the results of our second experiment, we associate 
attentional engagement with the attribution of human-like traits towards the agent that displays the 
behavior. Indeed, in our second experiment, participants evaluated the seemingly intentional behavior 
as the most anthropomorphic of the set. Additionally, the word-choice participant made to describe 
the behaviors was extremely accurate for the “intentional” ones, suggesting that it is easier for the 
observer to recognize the behavior of an artificial agent when the intent behind it is clear. It is 
important to point out that such facilitation does not depend solely upon the familiarity that 
participants perceived with the behaviors, but mostly to the degree of perceived intentionality and 
anthropomorphism. In other words, the degree of intentionality displayed by an artificial agent may 
affect attentional engagement, which, in turn, affects perceived familiarity and anthropomorphism. 
Thus, facilitating attentional engagement may be desirable to improve communication with artificial 
agents.  
In this sense, endowing artificial agents with human-like behaviors may boost communication and 
attunement towards them, a crucial aspect for deploying robots in environments where social 
interaction is inevitable (e.g., assistive robotics) (Leite, Martinho & Paiva, 2013). Our results bring 
further clarity to these hypotheses, highlighting the complex interplay between explicit attribution of 
anthropomorphic traits and attentional engagement. We claim that the attribution of anthropomorphic 
traits towards an artificial agent is the consequence of the perceived difficulty in processing the 
information related to its behavior. In turn, such perceived complexity may be modulated by the ease 
to ascribe intentions towards the artificial agent. However, it is important to point out that clarifying 
the causal relationship between attentional processing and attribution of anthropomorphism goes 
beyond the scope of the current work, and should be investigated in future research. 
The acceptance of robots as social agents might depend upon their ability to elicit adequately the 
same social cognitive processes that are required during human-human interaction, even at an implicit 
level (Dennett, 1971). At the same time, their behavior needs to be easy to predict and to understand 
from the user perspective (Leite, Martinho & Paiva, 2013). In the last decade, we have been exposed 






increasingly smooth and dynamic due to the implementation of human-like characteristics in the way 
artificial agents behave and communicate (González, Ramírez, & Viadel, 2012). The implementation 
of human-based and human-inspired behaviors in artificial agents may positively affect both implicit 
attentional processing and explicit attributions, and the spontaneity and naturalness of interaction 
(Dautenhahn, 2007). Furthermore, providing artificial agents with human-like behavior affects 
positively the quality of the interaction (Ghiglino et al., 2020b). In particular, when the physical 
aspect and the behavioral repertoire of artificial agents resemble one of the human beings, individuals 
tend to attribute spontaneously to the agent anthropomorphic traits, including mental states, 
intentional agency, and anthropomorphic traits (Ghiglino et al., 2020b). Subtle hints of human-
likeness displayed by a humanoid robot seem to affect attentional engagement and attribution of 
anthropomorphic traits (see, for example, Thepsoonthorn, Ogawa & Miyake, 2018; Martini, Buzzell 
& Wiese, 2015). However, we demonstrated that such claims could not be generalized to all possible 
behaviors that artificial agents might display during spontaneous interaction with the users. 
In conclusion, the current study supports the hypothesis that embedding robots with human-inspired 
behaviors may facilitate the interaction between them and humans. However, our results suggest that 
it is not sufficient to generate human-like behavior to ease the interaction. Besides, it may be crucial 
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Table 2 – Average Fixation Duration (FD) divided per condition and AOI 
 







Human Calibrating Congruent 101.25 69.04 68.08 
Incongruent 98.91 78.65 66.26 
Neutral 126.87 78.27 91.75 
Reading Congruent 98.07 61.36 95.31 
Incongruent 99.16 70.39 93.68 
Neutral 120.16 69.85 105.15 
Robot Calibrating Congruent 89.46 70.54 62.85 
Incongruent 85.76 63.74 63.96 
Neutral 116.28 77.26 84.89 
Reading Congruent 88.44 75.71 76.36 
Incongruent 92.33 73.45 75.53 
Neutral 103.44 72.36 93.89 
 
 
Table 3 – Detailed interactions and main effects on Fixation Duration (FD) in the AOI corresponding 
to eye region 
 




Agent -2.21 .028 -11.795 -22.141 -1.449 
Behavior -0.60 .432 -3.18 -13.526 7.166 
Context 3.52 <.001 19.012 8.575 29.448 
Agent x Behavior 0.29 .746 2.16 -12.472 16.791 
Agent x Context 1.03 .991 7.81 -6.879 22.512 
Behavior x Context 0.41 .183 3.422 -11.618 17.773 
Agent x Behavior x 
Context 
-1.39 .176 -14.905 -35.643 5.832 
Table 4 – Average Fixation Proportion (FP) divided per condition and AOI 
 







Human Calibrating Congruent 81.30 4.06 14.64 
Incongruent 81.01 5.12 13.87 
Neutral 79.83 5.71 14.46 
Reading Congruent 72.47 7.80 19.74 
Incongruent 73.85 6.14 20.01 






Robot Calibrating Congruent 81.88 5.28 12.84 
Incongruent 81.91 5.73 12.36 
Neutral 82.46 6.02 11.52 
Reading Congruent 80.46 5.56 13.98 
Incongruent 79.75 5.76 14.50 
Neutral 79.71 6.43 13.86 
 
 
Table 5 – Detailed interactions and main effects on Fixation Proportion (FP) in the AOI 
corresponding to eye region 
 




Agent  0.26 .799 0.005 -0.033 0.044 
Behavior  -5.85 <.001 -0.117 -0.156 -0.079 
Context  -1.29 .891 -0.026 -0.065 0.013 
Agent x Behavior  3.65 <.001 0.103 0.049 0.158 
Agent x Context  1.23 .735 0.034 -0.02 0.09 
Behavior x Context  1.79 .075 0.051 -0.004 0.106 
Agent x Behavior x 
Context 
 -2.01 .045 -0.081 -0.158 -0.003 
 
 
Table 6 – Average Decision Times (DTs) divided per condition 
 
Agent Behavior Context Average 
DTs 
Human Calibrating Congruent 5372.65 
Incongruent 5353.54 
Neutral 5399.91 
Reading Congruent 4235.94 
Incongruent 4204.50 
Neutral 4316.05 
Robot Calibrating Congruent 4502.33 
Incongruent 4654.01 
Neutral 4570.06 




Table 7 – Detailed interactions and main effects on Decision Times (DTs) in the AOI corresponding 
to eye region 
 










Behavior -7.71 <.001 -0.221 -0.276 -0.165 
Context 0.06 .958 0.001 -0.054 0.057 
Agent x Behavior 4.25 <.001 0.172 0.094 0.251 
Agent x Context 0.23 .604 0.028 -0.068 0.088 
Behavior x Context 0.35 .679 -0.015 -0.064 0.092 
Agent x Behavior x Context -0.67 .800 -0.038 -0.149 0.072 
 
Table 8 – Detailed effects of Agent and Behavior on participants' ratings of Naturalness, Awareness, 
Focus, and Interest 
 
Measure Effect Contrast β t(293)  p 2.5 % CI  97.5 % CI 
Naturalness Agent 
 




- 11.76 < .001 - - 
Behav. 
 












- 5.62 < .001 - - 
Awareness Agent 
 




- 8.59 < .001 - - 
Behav. 
 












- 6.81 < .001 - - 
Focus Agent 
 




- 6.75 < .001 - - 
Behav. 
 

















- 5.12 < .001 - - 
Interest Agent 
 




- 7.03 < .001 - - 
Behav. 
 






























































3 Synopsis of Results 
The work described in this thesis aimed at identifying some of the behavioral parameters that might 
make robots appear more human-like. This, in turn, may facilitate interaction and communication 
between artificial agents and their users. Specifically, studies reported in Section II could provide 
useful insights for robot developers and designers, as we highlighted that human-based behaviors 
boost attentional engagement and the attribution of anthropomorphic traits. As a cascade effect, we 
speculate that this might maximize attunement with the artificial agent and smooth communication 
between the agent and its user. Furthermore, we showed the importance of combining both explicit 
and implicit measures to assess individual differences and how humans behave during HRI scenarios.  
Publication I aimed at pinpointing the effects on human-likeness attribution towards a virtual agent 
(i.e. an avatar of the iCub robot) due to spatial and temporal information of the behavior it displays. 
Results of the study showed that temporal features of the movement displayed by the agent modulate 
the attribution of anthropomorphic traits more than spatial features. In detail, considering the set of 
behaviors implemented in the avatar, slower movements were rated by participants as more human-
like. This result suggests that human-likeness attribution does not rely only on pure kinematic 
patterns, but also on temporal dynamics. We found also a gender difference in our sample (i.e. females 
tended to rate higher the human-likeness of the avatar than males, regardless of the features of the 
behavior), supporting the idea that individual differences could bias the attribution of 
anthropomorphic traits.  
Following the results of Publication I, Publication II aimed at investigating more in detail individuals’ 
sensitivity towards human-based behaviors implemented in an embodied artificial agent (i.e. the iCub 
robot). The results of the study suggest that individuals’ a priori knowledge of the behavior displayed 
by the agent strongly affect their sensitivity in HRI scenarios. Specifically, the information that we 
provided to our participants before interacting with the robot overrode empirical evidence 
accumulated during the interaction and affected the attribution of anthropomorphic traits towards the 
iCub robot. In this study, we also further explored individual differences that could play a role during 
the interaction with artificial agents. Our results suggest that sociodemographic characteristics (i.e. 
years of education) and psychological traits (i.e., Conscientiousness and Neuroticism) that play a role 
during the interaction with other humans may affect also the interaction with humanoid robots or, at 
least, their attitudes towards them. 
In Publication III we tested the use of implicit measures (i.e. eye-tracking measures) to assess 
individuals’ reactions in HRI scenarios, along with self-report questionnaires. The study aimed at 






subtle hints of human-likeness displayed by an artificial agent in a screen-based experiment. Results 
of the experiment showed that participants tended to attribute higher human-likeness to movements 
that were markedly slow and variable, rather than movements that were within the human temporal 
range. This result is partially in line with Publication I, as it seems that movements displaying a slower 
temporal dynamic are perceived as more anthropomorphic than faster ones. Interestingly, our 
analyses of eye-tracking measures pointed out that attentional engagement was higher when 
participants observed human-range behaviors rather than when they were observing slow or non-
variable behaviors. Furthermore, considerably mechanistic behaviors (i.e. non-variable) recruited the 
use of a different scan path than human-range behaviors (i.e. variable), characterized by a greater 
number of fixations. Taken together, our results suggest that the explicit attribution of 
anthropomorphic traits does not necessarily reflect the easiness of processing behavioral information 
conveyed by an artificial agent. Indeed, explicit attributions may be biased by individuals’ priors 
towards robotics, which might be too strong to be modulated during short interactions with a robot 
during experimental protocols in the lab. This claim is in line with what was reported in Publication 
II.  
Publication IV complements results of Publication III, and combines, once again, implicit measures 
(i.e. eye-tracking data, decision times) with more explicit measures (i.e. self-report questionnaires). 
The aim of the last study presented in this thesis was to define differences in the processing of 
behaviors displayed by avatars either of a human being or a humanoid robot (i.e. the iCub robot). In 
the first experiment of this study, we focused on behaviors that can be defined as intentional (i.e. 
reading a text on a screen) and semi-intentional (i.e. following a dot moving on a screen. Results of 
this experiment pointed out a higher attentional engagement towards the human agent rather than the 
humanoid robot. Additionally, our results suggest that lower processing efforts\ is required to identify 
the “intentional” behavior. This result is in line with Publication III, as it suggests that, at the 
attentional level, highly variable human-based behaviors seem to be easier to process than repetitive, 
mechanistic behaviors (as in the case of following a dot on the screen). This supports the hypothesis 
that implementing human-based behavior into artificial agents can smoothen communication and, 
possibly, interaction. Furthermore, Experiment II of Publication IV highlighted that individuals are 
more accurate in the identification of intentional behaviors displayed by a robot than when it 
displayed more passive/mechanical behaviors. This is in line with Publication II and III, adding an 
important finding: implementing pure human-based kinematic patterns in an artificial agent might 
not be sufficient to elicit anthropomorphic attribution and to facilitate HRI if the intentions behind 








3.1 Implications for the investigation of social cognition in human-robot 
interaction 
 
Robots embedded with social abilities are designed to assist humans in daily routines.  Social robots 
are supposed to interact and support humans in several contexts, from the domestic to the healthcare 
environments. In order to smoothen the interaction and maximize the support that such technologies 
can provide, robots should be embedded with enough “social intelligence” to understand the needs 
of the user and provide an appropriate behavior. Tailoring the behavior of an artificial agent to the 
requests and needs of the human interacting with it is a huge challenge for social robotics. Aside from 
the development of appropriate technical solutions, it is crucial to understand, from a cognitive point 
of view, how humans interact with artificial agents. Indeed, the success of human-robot interaction 
depends not only on the technical capabilities and behavioral repertoire of the artificial agent but also 
on the ease with which humans attune and coordinate with it. Previous literature suggested that 
performance during human-robot interaction (HRI) may be boosted when the human socially attunes 
with the artificial agent, treating it as if it possessed mental states and anthropomorphic traits (see, 
for example, Wiese, Metta, & Wykowska, 2017).  However, social cognitive mechanisms displayed 
by humans during HRI scenarios could be influenced also by personality traits, demographic 
characteristics, cultural belonging, and previous experience with artificial agents. Indeed, the same 
interaction with the same robot could be perceived as smooth or stressful, depending on the user's 
biases and prior beliefs.  Several individual differences might concur in the attribution of mental states 
and intentional agency towards artificial agents. Still, the complex interplay between individual 
differences and artificial agents’ behaviors requires further systematic investigation. In particular, it 
is still unclear whether priors and biases towards social robots could be modulated by exposing 
individuals to direct HRI. Our results and, in particular, results of Publication II, suggest that exposing 
individuals to direct HRI might not be sufficient to modulate priors and biases. Conversely, some 
individuals’ dispositions towards artificial agents, including knowledge and experience with robotics, 
might override empirical evidence provided by the robot behavior and might modulate the attitude 
displayed during the interaction (Ciardo et al., 2020). Results reported in this thesis suggest the need 
of assessing such differences more in-depth, to better understand which personality traits and 
individual factors affect HRI. This includes the adoption of assessment tools that are typical of 






human-robot interaction as well. Exploring such a research topic is fundamental, as new technologies 
have become inexorably an integral part of our everyday life. However, it will be not sufficient to 
investigate HRI solely relying on the assessment of individuals’ dispositions and explicit measures 
of human-likeness attribution. As suggested by our results, HRI research should focus also on the 
investigation of individuals' automatic (and, often, implicit) reactions during interactive scenarios. 
The adoption of implicit measures able to discriminate whether an individual engages and attunes 
with an artificial agent is crucial for maximizing the communication between the two agents. 
Indeed, we are exposed to seemingly smart devices on a daily basis, and this makes the interaction 
with technology increasingly smooth and dynamic (Gonzàles et al., 2012). Recent literature well 
supports the idea that artificial agents able to behave like human beings facilitate the spontaneity and 
naturalness of interaction (Wiese, Metta & Wykowska, 2017). Providing artificial agents with human-
like behavior affects positively the quality of the interaction (Thepsoonthorn, Ogawa & Miyake, 
2018). In particular, when the physical aspect and the behavioral repertoire of artificial agents 
resemble one of the human beings, individuals tend to spontaneously attribute to the agent 
anthropomorphic traits, including mental states, intentional agency, (Martini, Buzzell, & Wiese, 
2015). The studies included in this thesis support this hypothesis and showed consistently that not 
only the attribution of human-like traits towards an artificial agent but also spontaneous attentional 
engagement can be modulated by the behavior it displays. We hypothesize that facilitating attentional 
engagement would cause, as a cascade effect, the improvement of the communication with artificial 
agents. Indeed, we consistently showed that intentional, human-like behaviors tend to be easier to 
process for the participants of our experiments. Thus, embedding artificial agents with human-like 
behaviors is supposed to boost social attunement towards them, and this aspect could be particularly 
crucial for deploying social robots in environments where social interaction is desirable (e.g., assistive 
robotics) (Leite, Martinho, & Paiva, 2013). Indeed, treating artificial agents as if they were 
anthropomorphic entities with a synthetic “mind” may help individuals during natural interactions, 
as these processes allow us to predict and explain the behaviors displayed by other individuals in 
every-day interactions with our conspecifics (Barresi & Moore, 1996). Previous research showed that 
similar mechanisms might be activated in interaction with artificial agents (Krach et al., 2008), and 
vary depending upon individual differences and available contextual information (Hinz, Ciardo, 
Wykowska, 2019). Our results bring further clarity to these hypotheses, highlighting the complex 
interplay between individual differences, explicit attribution of anthropomorphic traits, mind-
ascription, and attentional engagement. In particular, individual differences do not affect the implicit 






cognition. Indeed, attentional engagement seems to be mainly driven by the behavior of the artificial 
agent, rather than by the individual’s dispositions towards the agent itself. This provides useful insight 
that might be used for the development of artificial agents that will interact, in the future, with human 
users on a daily basis. The acceptance of robots as social companions might actually depend on their 
ability to adequately elicit such social cognitive processes during the interaction, even at an implicit 
level (Ghiglino et al., 2020). At the same time, social robots need to be able to understand the users’ 
needs, feelings, and intentions in order to adapt their skills and behaviors accordingly (Leite, 
Martinho, & Paiva, 2013).  
Previous studies investigated how attitudes and biases towards robotics could affect the interaction 
with artificial agents (Perez-Osorio et al., 2019), along with personality traits and cultural differences 
(Weiss, Evers, 2011). However, such systematic investigation of such individual differences has been 
scarce so far. Most of the past research relies solely on the administration of questionnaires and online 
surveys. Nevertheless, biases and attitudes towards social robots could be modulated during HRI 
scenarios, through the accumulation of empirical shreds of evidence (Cross, Hortensius, Wykowska, 
2019). In the current thesis, we explored the hypothesis that prior beliefs and attitudes towards 
artificial agents may affect social interaction with social robots, which, in turn, could modulate priors 
and attitudes, in circular logic. Indeed, it is still unclear whether eliciting mind ascription and human-
like traits towards social robots during the interaction could reduce negative attitudes and biases 
towards robots. Considerable progress has been made in recent years in terms of the technical 
realization of artificial agents. However, further interdisciplinary research is required to complement 
technical solutions with the understanding of social cognitive processes that are uniquely adopted 
during the interaction with social robots (Shellen, Wykowska, 2019).  Indeed, the ability of robots to 
socially and intuitively interact with the users is still limited, and future research on the psychological 
underpinning of HRI could improve both the design of artificial agents and our understanding of 
social cognitive mechanisms in humans. The work presented in this thesis supports the idea that the 
investigation of social cognition mechanisms elicited in HRI scenarios needs to comprise the 
collection of explicit and implicit measures, assessing individual’s differences/attitudes towards 
robots as well as attentional engagement during interaction with artificial agents. In particular, the 
combination of surveys and questionnaires with eye-tracker and behavioral measures allows for a 







3.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
Results reported in Section II highlight the importance of adopting a neuroscientific approach to HRI 
research. The integration of explicit and implicit measures of attunement and anthropomorphic 
attribution is desirable to explore how individuals interact with artificial agents. However, some 
limitations emerged during the studies that are reported in this thesis. First, we identified the lack of 
proper explicit measures that allow for a comprehensive understanding of individuals’ propensity to 
treat artificial agents as mentalistic, human-like entities. Furthermore, despite the existence of 
validated tools to evaluate participants' attitudes towards artificial agents, we identified a lack of tools 
that can assess properly individuals’ familiarity with robotics, which might affect attunement with a 
robotic agent. To compensate for these potential limitations, we developed two ad-hoc solutions: (1) 
the InStance questionnaire (Marchesi et al., 2019), which is aimed to evaluate individuals’ tendency 
to describe the behavior of an artificial agent with reference to mental states and intentions or with 
reference to its functioning; (2) the RobEx questionnaire (Perez-Osorio et al., 2019), which is aimed 
to assess individuals’ mastery with robotics. These measures provide useful pieces of information 
that should be taken into consideration for future research in HRI. However, future research should 
investigate more in-depth the relationship between such measures and other individuals’ 
characteristics that might affect HRI (i.e., personality traits, general attitudes towards robots), to 
provide the HRI community with a comprehensive battery of tests that can properly assess 
individuals’ dispositions.  
Another potential limitation of the studies proposed in this thesis is the nature of the presented 
experiments, which were either observational or screen-based. Indeed, natural and spontaneous 
interactions with artificial agents might lead to different social-cognitive processes than those 
reported in Section II. In particular, we speculate that the exposure to artificial agents that display 
hints of human-likeness during more interactive scenarios may boost social attunement, thus 
overriding individual priors and biases. Indeed, future research should investigate scenarios in which 
the “intentions” of the agents become crucial for the execution of a task. However, it is important to 
point out that the work reported was meant to lay grounds for further research by providing well-
controlled experiments addressing specific and “dissected” parameters of artificial agent behavior. 
Further research can extend these paradigms into more ecologically valid scenarios.  
3.3 Conclusions  
In the near future, social robots could assume roles of great relevance in the assistive care for 






solutions that can ease the interaction between social robots and their users is crucial. In the current 
work, we proposed an innovative approach to the investigation of social cognition mechanisms that 
use the combination of technological solutions (robotics) and neuroscientific methods (eye-tracking). 
Indeed, before implementing robots with the ability to adapt to their users, it is fundamental to identify 
(1) individual differences that play a role in social attunement toward artificial agents and (2) specific 
robot behaviors that might facilitate social attunement, attentional engagement, and communication. 
From one side, a deep understanding of individuals’ priors and biases towards robotics would 
optimize technical solutions aimed to bolster social interaction. In particular, it is crucial to 
understand the user’s behavioral and personality indicators of reduced comfort, stress, and poor 
mental state attribution during HRI scenarios, as such factors could undermine the social acceptability 
of artificial agents (Whelan et al., 2018). At the same time, it is fundamental to investigate what are 
the characteristics of artificial agents’ behavior that play a role in the ascription of mental states and 
intentions, as those might facilitate predictability and explainability of robot behavior, thereby 
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